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UNDERSTANDING AN OUTLIER: THE U.S. SYSTEM OF
AIRPORT GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC REGULATION
ROBERT A. HAZEL*

ABSTRACT
Unlike airports in many other countries which have been
corporatized or privatized, nearly all U.S. airports continue to
be operated by the public sector. They are subject to a system of
economic regulation that provides little incentive to control
costs or allocate capital efficiently. Yet, despite its apparent
shortcomings, the current system has persisted over several decades. This Article explains the persistence of the current U.S.
system of airport economic regulation based on price theory,
regulatory economics, and public choice principles. It offers
supporting empirical evidence for this equilibrium and identifies factors that might lead to a different outcome.
Elected officials benefit from the current system because it
permits them to bolster public employment, influence large
contract awards, and provide financial support for local causes
without relying on tax dollars. Airlines tolerate the current system, despite its inefficiencies, because airport costs are not a significant part of the airlines’ cost structure. Also, while airlines
have only a limited influence on airport spending decisions at
most airports, they have a greater influence on those decisions
at airports that are most important to their competitive position.
Airlines have more influence at airports with a high proportion
of connecting passengers that the airlines can credibly threaten
to re-route via other hub airports. Finally, airline executives are
risk-averse and fear that the alternative they wind up with could
be worse than the status quo. However, they have been willing to
support alternatives when the benefits are clearly demonstrated
and minimize the risks.
* Robert A. Hazel is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Economics at the
University of Missouri. Previously, he worked in the aviation industry as a
regulatory attorney, airline executive, and management consultant.
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I. INTRODUCTION
.S. AIRPORTS ARE NOT the envy of the world,1 and
neither is the U.S. system of airport economic regulation.
As other countries worldwide have taken steps to corporatize,
commercialize, or privatize their airports,2 U.S. airports have remained almost exclusively creatures of the public sector, subject
to a system of economic regulation that provides little incentive
to control costs or allocate capital efficiently.3
Yet, despite its apparent shortcomings, the current system has
endured over many decades. This Article explains the persistence of the current U.S. system of airport economic regulation
based on price theory, regulatory economics, and public choice
principles. It offers evidence in support of this explanation and
identifies factors that might lead to a different outcome.
Elected officials benefit from the current system because their
local airport control permits them to bolster public employment, influence contract awards, provide financial support for
local causes, and frequently obtain campaign contributions
from firms interested in the airport business. Airport spending
is not subject to voter scrutiny like other municipal spending

U

1 Based on passenger surveys, the top-rated U.S. airport in terms of customer
satisfaction is Houston George Bush, which ranks 25th among the world’s top
100 airports. World’s Top 100 Airports 2021, SKYTRAX WORLD AIRPORT AWARDS,
https://www.worldairportawards.com/worlds-top-100-airports-2021/ [https://
perma.cc/CJ84-7VRZ]. In 2014, then-Vice President Joseph Biden likened LaGuardia airport “to what one might find ‘in a third world country.’” Marc
Santora, Some See Biden’s ‘Third World’ Description of La Guardia as Too Kind, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 7, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/08/nyregion/somesee-third-world-as-too-kind-for-la-guardia.html [https://perma.cc/25AB-DZM4].
In 2016, then-presidential candidate Donald Trump made similar remarks, calling out LAX and New York City’s three international airports: LaGuardia, John F.
Kennedy and Newark, as third-world airports. See Dennis Romero, Donald Trump
Just Called LAX a “Third World” Airport, LA Weekly (Sept. 27, 2016), http://
www.laweekly.com/news/Donald-trump-just-called-lax-a-third-world-airport7432646 [https://perma.cc/2X4G-L35H].
2 Tae H. Oum, Nicole Adler & Chunyan Yu, Privatization, Corporatization, Ownership Forms and Their Effects on the Performance of the World’s Major Airports, 12 J. AIR
TRANSP. MGMT. 109, 109 (2006) (“With the exception of the US, corporatization,
commercialization and privatization of airports have become the worldwide
trend.” (footnote omitted)); see Robert Poole & Chris Edwards, Privatizing U.S.
Airports, 76 CATO INST. TAX & BUDGET BULL. (2016), https://www.cato.org/sites/
cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/tbb-76_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VVN-X3M5] (stating
that, as of 2016, “75 percent of passenger trips in the EU are now through privatized airports”); see also Anne Graham, Airport Privatisation: A Successful Journey?, 89
J. AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 101930, 101930 (2020).
3 See RACHEL Y. TANG, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43545, AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 1 (2021).
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because airports are funded primarily by fees paid by airlines
and airport concessionaires, not by taxes charged to local voting
residents.4 Additionally, airport charges are usually not a significant concern for elected officials because airlines and other tenants’ demand for airport access is relatively price inelastic.5
Airlines tolerate the current system for several reasons. First,
airport costs remain a small percentage of total airline costs,
averaging only 5%–7%.6 Second, while airlines have only a limited influence on airport spending decisions and, in turn, airport charges at most airports, they have a greater influence on
spending at hub airports, which are essential to their competitive position.7 Finally, airline executives are risk-averse and fear
that the alternative could be worse than the status quo; however,
they have been willing to support alternatives such as privatization when the benefits are clear and airline executives can minimize the risks.8
This Article does not argue that privatization is superior to the
current system but points out that, all other things being equal,
it offers one undeniable benefit to municipalities—a substantial
payment for the transfer of control. The title of a recent article
in the Atlantic, “Privatizing Airports Is a No-Brainer: Cities
Should Sell Their Airports to Close Gaping Budget Holes,” highlights this aspect of privatization and quotes D.J. Gribbin, an infrastructure consultant, as saying, “[i]f any U.S. city wanted to
do a deal for its airport, there’d be a line of investors down the
4 Airport Infrastructure Funding, AIRPORTS COUNCIL INT’L, https://airportscouncil.org/advocacy/airport-infrastructure-funding/#:
~:text=IN%20reality%2C%20infrastructure%20projects%20at,and%20tenant
%20rents%20and%20fees [https://perma.cc/V63J-KCYV].
5 David B. Richard, The Changing Price Elasticity of Demand for Domestic Airline
Travel, TRANSP. RSCH. FORUM 1 (Mar. 2009), https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/agsndtr09/207597.htm [https://perma.cc/SCH4-J7RR] (click hyperlink
under “Downloads: (external link)”).
6 In connection with this Article, the Author reviewed and analyzed various
Forms 127 filed with the FAA via the Airport Financial Reporting Program Web
Site (CATS). (CATS) View Reports and Spreadsheets, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://
cats.airports.faa.gov/Reports/reports.cfm [https://perma.cc/396T-ZJQC] (on
file with author).
7 See IAN TWINN, NAVAID QURESHI, DANIEL SEBASTIAN PEREA ROJAS & MARIA LÓPEZ CONDE, THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON AIRPORTS: AN ANALYSIS 2 (May 2020),
https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/26d83b55-4f7d-47b1-bcf301eb996df35a/IFC-Covid19-Airport-FINAL_web3.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&
CVID=n8lgpkG [https://perma.cc/S347-WB5M].
8 See Poole & Edwards, supra note 2.
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block tomorrow.”9 Therefore, for municipalities to show almost
no interest in privatizing their airports, they must have concluded that the negative attributes of privatization outweigh the
benefits of the payment received for transfer of control.
Researchers have suggested various reasons for this lack of interest in U.S. airport privatization, including that privatized airports would lose financial benefits, such as favorable tax
treatment of some airport debt.10 This Article’s conclusion is instead that local governments rarely initiate serious privatization
efforts because elected officials place a high value on the public
choice-related returns from continued local control. Only if
those returns diminish substantially or if the returns to elected
officials from privatization increase substantially is the U.S. likely
to move away from the current system of publicly managed
airports.
There is a large body of economic literature on the regulation
of monopolies. Paul L. Joskow and Nancy L. Rose point out that
the effects of regulation “are likely to depend on a variety of
factors: the motivation for regulation, the nature of regulatory
instruments and structure of the regulatory process, the industry’s economic characteristics, and the legal and political environment in which regulation takes place.”11 The foundational
work by Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole analyzes the incentive properties of different economic, regulatory systems, including the impact of constraints designed to reduce costs and the
amount of rent extraction.12 With specific regard to airports,
prior research focuses on the factors that influence the success
of airport privatizations, including the effects of the form of airport governance and economic regulation on airport perform9 Joseph Guinto, Privatizing Airports Is a No-Brainer: Cities Should Sell Their Airports to Close Gaping Budget Holes, ATLANTIC (Aug. 18, 2020), https://
www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/08/sell-airports/615331/ [https://
perma.cc/YX5K-N5EU].
10 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-42, AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION: LIMITED INTEREST DESPITE FAA’S PILOT PROGRAM 20–22 (2014).
11 Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose, The Effects of Economic Regulation, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1450, 1451 (R. Schmalensee & R.D. Willig
eds., 1989).
12 See generally Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms, 94 J. POL. ECON. 614 (1986); Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The
Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture, 106 Q. J.
ECON. 1089 (1991); JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PROCUREMENT AND REGULATION (1993).
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ance and efficiency.13 There does not appear to be any prior
scholarly work analyzing why the U.S. system of airport economic regulation has persisted as the rest of the world has
moved towards privatization.
Part II of this Article discusses the current U.S. system of airport governance and economic regulation, and Part III discusses
why the current system persists. Part II is organized into seven
Sections. Section A describes the evolution of the U.S. airport
business and airport economic regulation. Section B discusses
the low price elasticity of demand for airport access and how this
facilitates higher airport spending. Section C explains why the
non-distribution constraint at the core of U.S. airport economic
regulation is ineffective as applied to airports. Section D illustrates how elected officials use the regulations to obtain funding
from airlines and other airport customers to achieve patronage
goals. Section E asks whether politicians are less involved in directing airport spending when airports are governed as “independent” airport authorities. Section F discusses the limited role
of consumers and voters in determining how airports are managed. Finally, Section G summarizes the issues with the current
system.
Part III is organized into five Sections. Section A discusses the
benefits and costs of privatization as an alternative. Section B
describes how the U.S. version of privatization differs from other
versions. Section C explains why airport privatization has not
been adopted in the U.S. and discusses the costs incurred in
changing airport-governance methods. Section D addresses the
forces that help keep airport charges down at some airports. Finally, Section E identifies the factors that might lead to a different regulatory solution.
13 See generally Graham, supra note 2; Nicole Adler & Vanessa Liebert, Joint Impact of Competition, Ownership Form and Economic Regulation on Airport Performance
and Pricing, 64 TRANSP. RSCH. PART A 92 (2014); A. Georges Assaf & David Gillen,
Measuring the Joint Impact of Governance Form and Economic Regulation on Airport Efficiency, 220 EUR. J. OPERATIONAL RSCH. 187 (2012); George C.L. Bezerra & Carlos
F. Gomes, Performance Measurement in Airport Settings: A Systematic Literature Review,
23 BENCHMARKING: AN INT’L J. 1027 (2016); Vincenzo Fasone & Sandra ZapataAguirre, Measuring Business Performance in the Airport Context: A Critical Review of
Literature, 65 INT’L J. PRODUCTIVITY & PERFORMANCE MGMT. 1137 (2016); Levent
Kutlu & Patrick McCarthy, US Airport Ownership, Efficiency, and Heterogeneity, 89
TRANSP. RSCH. PART E 117 (2016); Vanessa Liebert & Hans-Martin Niemeier, A
Survey of Empirical Research on the Productivity and Efficiency Measurement of Airports,
47 J. TRANSP. ECON. & POL’Y 157 (2013); Oum et al., supra note 2; Bijan Vasigh &
Javad Gorjidooz, Productivity Analysis of Public and Private Airports: A Causal Investigation, 11 J. AIR TRANSP. 144 (2006).
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PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM
A.

THE ORIGINS

OF THE

CURRENT SYSTEM

In this Part, this Article argues that the current U.S. airport
economic regulation system has obvious drawbacks. It does so by
describing the origin of the U.S. airport business, the evolution
of U.S. airport economic regulation, and the different types of
public-sector governance of U.S. airports.
1.

The Path to Airport Financial Self-Sufficiency and Pass-Through
Rate-Setting

With the rapid growth of aviation in the 1920s and 1930s, local governments began purchasing previously private airports
and acquiring land to develop airports.14 Then, during World
War II, the federal government constructed and improved many
airports as part of the defense buildup.15 The federal government transferred excess military airfields to local governments
for public use under the Surplus Property Act when the war ended.16 As a result, most airports in the U.S. are owned by the
municipality or county where they are located.17 As discussed
subsequently in Section III.C.2, local ownership of U.S. airports,
as opposed to national ownership as in many other countries, is
an important factor that helps explain why nearly all U.S. airports continue to be operated by the public sector.
During the early years of commercial aviation, airports received subsidies from local governments interested in encouraging the growth of commercial aviation.18 In addition, many
municipalities provided financing for airport capital projects using general obligation bonds backed by the local government’s
credit and taxing power.19 During these early years, airport rateAirline Expansion and Innovation (1927–1941), SMITHSONIAN NAT’L AIR &
SPACE MUSEUM, https://airandspace.si.edu/exhibitions/america-by-air/online/
innovation/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/2ABT-5P9D].
15 OFF. TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-STI-231, AIRPORT SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 13,
209 (1984) (noting the federal appropriation of $40 million for construction and
improvement of 250 airports during World War II).
16 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 10, at 3.
17 See DANIEL S. REIMER & JOHN E. PUTNAM, AIRPORT GOVERNANCE AND OWNERSHIP 10–11 (2009). There are a few exceptions, such as BWI, which is owned and
operated by the state of Maryland, and Reagan National and Washington Dulles,
which are owned by the federal government and operated by an airport authority
on land leased from the federal government. See id. at 5, 21 n.120.
18 See Poole & Edwards, supra note 2 (referencing early airport history).
19 See OFF. TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 149.
14
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setting typically involved charging ad hoc fees that recovered
only part of the cost of running the airport.20
Over time, airports switched to issuing long-term airport revenue bonds backed solely by the airport’s revenue.21 Initially, the
successful issuance of these bonds depended on the airlines providing a collective guarantee that the airlines would pay the
bondholders back; in the event of a bankruptcy or default by an
individual airline, the other airlines would make up the shortfall
needed to pay bondholders.22 In exchange for the guarantee,
the airlines usually obtained approval rights over major airport
capital spending decisions.23 They also benefited from a standard rate-setting approach whereby the airlines were responsible for paying the “residual” amount needed for the airport to
break even after collecting rents and fees from concessionaires,
such as car rental agencies, restaurants, and gift shops.24 Because the concessionaires usually generated substantial profits
for the airport, airlines wound up paying less than the actual
cost of the facilities they used.25
With the tremendous growth in commercial aviation, all but
the smallest commercial service airports became financially selfsufficient. Nearly all airports categorized by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) as Large, Medium, or Small Hub Airports, which collectively carry over 97% of all U.S. passengers,26
no longer need or receive funding from local governments.27 In
See Poole & Edwards, supra note 2.
See BENJAMIN M. MILLER, DEBRA KNOPMAN, LISA ECOLA, BRIAN PHILLIPS,
MOON KIM, NATHANIEL EDENFIELD, DANIEL SCHWAM & DIOGO PROSDOCIMI, U.S.
AIRPORT INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING AND FINANCING 113–14 (2020), https://
www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR3100/RR3175/
RAND_RR3175.pdf [https://perma.cc/LUE7-J4TR]. Airport revenue bonds are
bonds backed solely by the revenue of the airport, as opposed to taxpayers. See id.
at 113–15. The first airport revenue bond was issued by the City of Miami in 1945
to support construction at what is now Miami International Airport. See MIAMIDADE AVIATION DEP’T, FY 2021 ADOPTED BUDGET 15 (2021).
22 See, e.g., Zane O. Gresham & Brian Busey, “Do as I Say and Not as I Do”—
United States Behind in Airport Privatization, 17 AIR & SPACE LAW. 12, 15 (2002).
23 See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Theory and Law of Airport Revenue Diversion, 2 LEGAL RSCH. DIG., May 2008, at 3, 3–5.
24 See id.
25 See id.
26 In connection with this Article, the Author reviewed and analyzed the FAA
Form 127 database for FY2019. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 6 (choose
“2019” from “Year” dropdown; then select an airport from “Airport” dropdown;
then click “Screen” under “View Form 127”).
27 See AIRPORTS COUNCIL INT’L, supra note 4. From the early days of commercial
aviation, the federal government has both helped fund airports and taxed com20
21
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many cases, airports also no longer need a collective guarantee
from the airlines to issue airport revenue bonds because the
bond market expects that airports can charge the remaining airlines enough to remain financially viable in the event of the failure or withdrawal of an airline.28
Once airports became financially self-sufficient, airlines became concerned that airports were locational monopolies that
could abuse their monopoly power.29 Airlines argued that they
were legally entitled to the benefit of residual rate-setting on the
ground that airline passengers were the ultimate source of all
commercial airport revenue—i.e., without the airline, there
would be no car rental, gift shop, or other concession revenue
for the airport.30 But, in 1994, after more than ten years of litigation, the Supreme Court ruled that airlines were not entitled to
the benefits of residual rate-setting and that airports could instead require airlines to pay the total costs of the facilities they
used so long as the charges were “based on some fair approximation of use of the facilities” and were “not excessive in relation to the benefits conferred.”31
mercial aviation. See BART ELIAS & RACHEL Y. TANG, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42781,
FEDERAL CIVIL AVIATION PROGRAMS: IN BRIEF 2 (2018). Federal taxes on tickets,
aviation fuel, and other items currently raise about $15 billion annually, the majority of which is used to pay for the federal air traffic control system. See id.
About 20% percent is returned to airports in the form of grants. See id.
28 See, e.g., Gresham & Busey, supra note 22, at 15.
29 See, e.g., Dempsey, supra note 23, at 11. Researchers are not in agreement on
whether airports are natural monopolies and, if so, by what definition. Alfred
Kahn, whose work on airline deregulation is seminal, and others define natural
monopoly by continuous economies of scale, i.e., decreasing average costs. See 1
ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS
123–24 (1970). Under this definition, however, airports may not qualify. Rigas
Doganis and Jinha Jeong conclude that scale economies for airports cease when
they reach the relatively small size of three million passengers per year. RIGA
DOGANIS, THE AIRPORT BUSINESS 50 (1992); Jinha Jeong, An Investigation of Operating Cost of Airports: Focus on the Effects of Output Scale 58 (May 2005)
(Master’s Thesis, University of British Columbia), https://open.library.ubc.ca/
media/stream/pdf/831/1.0092229/1 [https://perma.cc/3HNH-G9KQ]. Airports have been referred to as natural monopolies, locational monopolies (or just
as entities capable of extracting locational rents), regional non-contestable monopolies, etc.
30 Letter from John H. Anderson, Jr., Dir., Transp. Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office, to Hon. Frank R. Wolf, Chairman, Subcomm. on Transp. & Related Agencies, Comm. on Appropriations, House Representatives 10–12 (Nov. 5,
1998).
31 Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 510 U.S. 355, 369–70 (1994); see also
Rise J. Peters, Northwest Airlines v. County of Kent, Michigan: More Than You Ever
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U.S. airport economic regulations issued since the Supreme
Court ruling impose two primary constraints that limit airport
charges to airlines (referred to as aeronautical charges).32 First,
aeronautical charges must be “fair and reasonable,”33 which has
been interpreted to mean that airports can pass through to airlines the actual costs of the airfield facilities and services they
use but cannot charge market rates to airlines.34 Airports can,
however, charge other commercial tenants full market rates.35

Wanted to Know About Airport Ratesetting, Part One (Pricing in the Courts), 22 TRANSP.
L.J. 291, 302–03 (1994).
32 See generally George Saounatsos, Airport Aeronautical Charges, 40 AIRPORTS
INT’L 59 (2007). The basic aeronautical/nonaeronautical distinction is the distinction between charges to airlines for use of the runways and other airport
facilities required to provide air transportation, and charges to other tenants. See
id.
33 Policy and Procedures Concerning the Use of Airport Revenue, 64 Fed. Reg.
7696, 7720 (Feb. 16, 1999), amended by Policy Regarding Airport Rates and
Charges, 78 Fed. Reg. 55,330, 55,332–33, 55,335 (Sept. 10, 2013).
34 The requirement originates in the 1973 Anti-Head Tax Act and the 1982
Airport and Airways Improvement Act. Both require airports to charge “reasonable” fees from aircraft operators for using airport facilities. See 49 U.S.C.
§ 40116(e)(2). In 1999, the FAA issued its Final Policy Regarding Airport Rates
and Charges, which states airfield fees must be cost-based and that the associated
assets must be valued based on historic costs. Policy Regarding Airport Rates and
Charges, 78 Fed. Reg. at 55,335. Airports have greater latitude regarding airport
terminal rental rates charged to airlines. See Anne Graham, The Regulation of US
Airports, in THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF AIRPORTS 63, 63–72 (Peter Forsyth,
David W. Gillen, Andreas Knorr, Otto G. Mayer, Hans-Martin Niemeier & David
Starkie eds., 2016) (detailing a useful summary of U.S. legislative and regulatory
framework).
35 Airports are legally entitled to charge airlines the full cost of the facilities
they use, while retaining all profits from parking, retail and other concessions at
the airport, but in practice they often share their concession profits with the airlines by applying a portion of the profits to reduce the rates airlines pay. See Sheri
Ernico & Jason Snowden, Directors, LeighFisher, Address at the AAAE/
LeighFisher Rates and Charges Workshop: Emerging Trends in Airport-Airline
Agreements (Nov. 4, 2016). In a typical airline-airport lease negotiation, the airlines argue that the airport should share more of the concession profits with
them, while the airport argues that it should retain more of the concession profits to use at its discretion at the airport. See id. Should negotiations break down,
both sides recognize that airports are entitled to simply enact an ordinance imposing rates that reflect the full cost of the facilities used by the airlines without
any concession profit sharing. See id. However, most airports prefer to avoid unilaterally imposing rates and instead prefer to reach agreement with the airlines,
especially since the profits generated by airport concessions cannot legally be
used for off-airport uses, i.e., cannot be transferred to the municipal airport
owner. See id. Less than 20% of U.S. airports are estimated to impose fees by
enacting an ordinance. See id.
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Second, airports must not divert airport revenue to non-airport
purposes, which is known as “revenue diversion.”36
This second constraint, which the FAA enforces, requires that
airport profits be reinvested in the airport.37 This constraint is
intended to reinforce the requirement that aeronautical charges
be limited to actual costs.38 Airlines fear that without this constraint, airports may take revenue collected from airport tenants, spend it on non-airport activities, and then increase the
charges to the airlines to compensate.39 Similarly, the FAA fears
that if airports use airport-generated revenue for non-airport activities, this may increase airport demands for FAA grant
funding.40
Modern airports are comprised of a diverse set of businesses41
and may generate hundreds of millions of dollars in annual revenue.42 Parking revenue, rental car fees, food and beverage
sales, and retail sales (concession revenue) generate substantial
profits.43 The financial resilience of airports is illustrated by the
fact that defaults on U.S. airport revenue bonds—the largest
source of airport capital funding—are nearly unheard of, and
nearly all such bonds are rated as investment grade.44 At pre36 See Dempsey, supra note 23, at 21–22 (stating the specific U.S. requirement
that airport revenues must be used only to meet the capital and operating cost
requirements of the airport and closely related ground access projects). The nondistribution constraint is embodied in the 1994 and 1996 FAA Authorization and
Reauthorization Acts, the 1999 Policy Statement, and in grant agreements that all
airports must sign when they receive FAA grant money. See Dempsey, supra note
23, at 21–22; Graham, supra note 34, at 66.
37 See Dempsey, supra note 23, at 16.
38 See id. at 13, 20.
39 Id. at 9–10.
40 In 1999, the FAA issued its Policy and Procedures Concerning the Use of
Airport Revenue, which prohibits “payments which are not based on appropriate
cost allocation methods; costs associated with general economic development
and marketing activities; payments in lieu of taxes that exceed the values of services provided; payments to compensate government bodies for lost tax revenues;
loans to government agencies at less than the prevailing interest rate.” Graham,
supra note 34, at 66.
41 See Doganis, supra note 29, at 113.
42 See AIRPORTS COUNCIL INT’L, 2018 ACI-NA CONCESSIONS BENCHMARKING SURVEY (2018).
43 See id.
44 See, e.g., Fitch IBCA Default Study’s Impact on Airport Revenue Bonds, FITCHRATINGS (Feb. 17, 2000, 9:51 AM), https://www.fitchratings.com/research/us-publicfinance/fitch-ibca-default-study-impact-on-airport-revenue-bonds-17-02-2000
[https://perma.cc/9ZBH-6SC7] (“The median Fitch IBCA GARB rating for all
applicable U.S. airports is ‘A+’, reflecting above average investment grade credit
quality.”).
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sent, all U.S. airport revenue bonds are investment grade, and
no airport bond rated by Moody’s Investor Service has defaulted
in at least the past 50 years.45 In contrast, all the largest U.S.
airlines, except Southwest, have filed for bankruptcy at least
once,46 and only two airlines—Southwest Airlines and, recently,
Delta Air Lines—have obtained investment-grade ratings for
their bonds.47 During the pandemic, Southwest Airlines retained its investment-grade rating,48 while Delta Air Lines was
downgraded to below investment grade in March 2020.49 Not
surprisingly, cities and counties look at airports as attractive
sources of revenue.
2.

Airport Governance

In their capacity as airport owners, local governments decide
how airports are governed, usually as a city or county department or as an airport authority, a quasi-governmental entity reMOODY’S INVS. SERV., US PUBLIC FINANCE: US MUNICIPAL BOND DEFAULTS
RECOVERIES, 1970-2020 (2021); MOODY’S INVS. SERV., FISCAL 2019 MEDIANS:
STRONG ECONOMIC CONDITIONS PUSHED METRICS TO RECORD HIGHS THAT WILL
NOT RETURN FOR SEVERAL YEARS (2020); see also, e.g., FITCHRATINGS, supra note 44
(explaining that during the 20-year period from 1979–1999, “no airports with
significant commercial service defaulted on GARB debt. Also, no airport debt
rated by Fitch IBCA has defaulted.”); MILLER ET AL., supra note 21, at 117–118
(“Of the 8,054 municipal bonds that include the word ‘airport’ in the bond
description (as of June 2019) in the Electronic Municipal Market Access
(EMMA) database of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB), only
25 bonds were rated below investment grade by one of the three major credit
agencies: Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch (MSRB, undated). Also, in
Fitch’s database of more than 70 U.S. airports rated by the agency, only one airport rated below investment grade.” (footnote omitted)).
46 See Associated Press, American Joins Long List of Airline Bankruptcies, BOSTON.COM (Nov. 29, 2011), http://archive.boston.com/business/articles/2011/
11/29/american_joins_long_list_of_airline_bankruptcies/ [https://perma.cc/
F4P7-5KM3].
47 See Dan Reed, S&P Airline Downgrades Leave Just One U.S. Carrier With Investment Grade Status, Three Worldwide, FORBES (Aug. 13, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/danielreed/2020/08/13/sp-airline-downgrades-are-moreominous-than-surprising-just-one-us-carrier-retains-investment-grade-status/
[https://perma.cc/4K5L-J384].
48 Michael Goldstein, Are Airline Bonds Scarier Than Airline Stocks Because of SubPar Credit Ratings?, FORBES (Mar. 18, 2021, 05:27 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/michaelgoldstein/2021/03/18/are-airline-bonds-and-airline-stocks-tellingdifferent-stories/?sh=3a0b9f92cffa [https://perma.cc/67N5-DA2N].
49 Rey Mashayekhi, Delta Is Downgraded to the “Junk” Pile—and May Soon Have
Lots of Company, FORTUNE (Mar. 24, 2020, 04:53 PM), https://fortune.com/2020/
03/24/delta-credit-downgrade-junk-corporate-bonds-coronavirus-airlines/
[https://perma.cc/2VC2-E2NZ].
45
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sponsible for the operation of an airport or group of airports.50
In addition, some airports are managed as part of multi-modal
port authorities.51 The three largest U.S. airports as measured by
annual passengers—Atlanta, Los Angeles, and Chicago
O’Hare—are managed as city departments.52 Airports managed
as part of city or county governments (municipal airports) handle a majority of U.S. passengers.53 Table 1 shows the approximate breakdown of U.S. airports into different governance
types.
Table 1—Type of governance and percentage of passengers at
U.S. airports with greater than two million departing
passengers. These airports handle 88% of all
U.S. passengers.54
Governance Type

Number

% of Total % of Passengers

City

23

38%

47.0%

Airport Authority

18

30%

22.5%

Port Authority

9

15%

16.6%

County

6

10%

9.5%

State

4

7%

3.8%

Private

1

2%

0.6%

Total
61
100%
100%
At municipal airports, the airport manager often “reports directly to the mayor, city manager, county executive, or county
commissioners.”55 At airport authorities, the airport manager re50 BOB HAZEL, OLIVER WYMAN, CHARLOTTE AIRPORT GOVERNANCE STUDY FINAL
REPORT 14, 16 (2013), http://charmeck.org/city/charlotte/documents/airport
%20governance%20study/20130501%20clt%20airport%20governance
%20ow%20vf.pdf [https://perma.cc/98FU-D9ZV] (“Airport authorities may be
created by state legislation, municipal or county action, or sometimes by joint
agreement among jurisdictions. The Dallas/Fort Worth Board of Directors,
which operates DFW, is the product of an agreement between the cities of Dallas
and Fort Worth.”).
51 Id. at 15.
52 Id. at 55.
53 Infra Table 1; see Hazel, supra note 50, at 55–59.
54 In connection with this Article, the Author reviewed and analyzed airport
websites and U.S. DOT passenger data for 2015. For additional information on
airport governance structures at U.S. airports, see Hazel, supra note 50, at 12–25.
55 Hazel, supra note 50, at 14.
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ports to the authority board, with most board appointments
made by elected officials.56
Although airport staff are public-sector employees, their salaries are not paid from general tax revenue but from enterprise
funds, which are segregated accounts funded by revenue collected from airlines and other commercial tenants.57 The costs
of municipal police, fire, payroll administration, and other services provided to the airport, including associated overhead, are
also paid from these funds.58 The airport manager is often the
highest paid local government employee at large airports and
makes more than the mayor.59
B.

THE PRICE ELASTICITY

OF

DEMAND

FOR

AIRPORT ACCESS

This Section discusses the lack of economic incentives in the
current U.S. airport economic regulation system for airports to
control costs or allocate capital efficiently. Not only are airports
able to fully pass through their costs to the airlines, but the demand by airlines for airport access is price inelastic: an increase
in airport charges has little effect on the demand by airlines to
continue to serve an airport.60 Price inelasticity is best understood by examining two important determinants of price elasticity: (1) the availability of substitutes for individual airports; and
(2) the proportion of airline costs spent on airport access.61 This
Article reviews both determinants of elasticity below.
See, e.g., id. at 9, 52.
Enterprise Fund Definition, ACCOUNTINGTOOLS (Mar. 27, 2021), https://
www.accountingtools.com/articles/2017/5/6/enterprise-fund [https://
perma.cc/NAK8-6SAE] (“An enterprise fund is a self-supporting government
fund that sells goods and services to the public for a fee. . .For example, a government-owned power generating facility provides electricity to local homeowners in
exchange for a fee.”); Roger Kemp, The Use of Enterprise Funds in America’s Local
Governments, PA TIMES (May 16, 2017), https://patimes.org/enterprise-fundsamericas-local-governments/ [https://perma.cc/4S5A-WWGL].
58 See infra notes 118–121 and accompanying text.
59 See, e.g., Fran Spielman, Emanuel Gives Pay Raises to Mayor’s Office Staff, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (Oct. 14, 2016, 8:26 AM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/
emanuel-gives-pay-raises-to-mayors-office-staff/ [https://perma.cc/ZY64-LMA5];
Brian Sumers, LAX Chief Will Stay on in Garcetti Administration, DAILY BREEZE,
https://www.dailybreeze.com/2013/10/07/lax-chief-will-stay-on-in-garcetti-administration/ [https://perma.cc/LL39-WA2U] (Sep. 6, 2017, 6:46 AM).
60 See supra notes 5, 34 and accompanying text.
61 These two determinants of elasticity are typically identified in basic economics texts as: (1) closeness of substitutes—the closer the available substitute, the
more likely you are to switch to that substitute if the price of the primary good
increases; and (2) budget share spent on the good. DARON ACEMOGLU, DAVID
LAIBSON & JOHN A. LIST, MICROECONOMICS 108 (3d ed. 2022) (“If the good repre56
57
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The Availability of Substitutes

Passengers have varying degrees of willingness to trade-off trip
costs and travel time.62 A price-sensitive leisure traveler is more
likely to be willing to accept a flight to a remote secondary airport than a time-sensitive business traveler.63 Still, most travelers
consider airports located far from each other to be poor
substitutes.64
In addition, most metropolitan areas are served by only a single commercial service airport. Moreover, even in large metropolitan areas served by multiple airports, an airline attempting
to substitute one airport for another generally would not benefit
from price competition between the airports because, in most
metropolitan areas, the same public entity owns and controls all
of the local airports. The city of Chicago operates both Chicago
O’Hare and Chicago Midway;65 the city of Houston operates
both Houston Intercontinental and Houston Hobby;66 and the
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) operates
JFK, LaGuardia, Newark, and Stewart.67
The rates charged by each airport in these metropolitan areas
are a function of each airport’s operating and capital costs and
the concession revenue generated at the airport—airports
under common ownership do not compete with each other
based on price.68 Whatever competition exists between these airports is the result of competition between the airlines serving
them.69 For example, Southwest Airlines has a large hub at Chisents a small fraction of your overall purchases . . . [i]t is just not important to
your overall budget and so you are not sensitive to price changes, even large
ones.”).
62 See Gary M. Fournier, Monica E. Hartmann & Thomas Zuehlke, Airport Substitution by Travelers: Why Do We Have to Drive to Fly? 5–6 (Fla. State Univ. & Univ.
St. Thomas, Working Paper No. wp2005_09_01, 2005).
63 See James Wiltshire, Airport Competition: Reality or Myth?, 67 J. AIR TRANSP.
MGMT. 241, 245 (2018).
64 See id. at 242–45.
65 Chicago Department of Aviation, CITY OF CHICAGO, https://www.chicago.gov/
city/en/depts/doa.html [https://perma.cc/NFF7-YGNS].
66 Newsroom: Fact Sheets, HOUSTON AIRPORT SYSTEM, https://www.fly2houston.
com/newsroom/media-kit/fact-sheets [https://perma.cc/4UM8-MM49].
67 Aviation, PORT AUTH. N.Y. & N.J., https://www.jointheportauthority.com/
pages/aviation [https://perma.cc/9JUW-66S2].
68 See Dan Elliott, The Ins-and-Outs of Airport Pricing, FRONTIER ECON., http://
www.frontier-economics.com/uk/en/news-and-articles/articles/article-i6484-theins-and-outs-of-airport-pricing/# [https://perma.cc/9YD9-RUE2].
69 WILLIAM
M. SWAN, HOW AIRLINES COMPETE 1 (2002), http://aviation.itu.edu.tr/%5Cimg%5Caviation%5Cdatafiles/Lecture%20Notes/Aviation
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cago Midway, while United Airlines and American Airlines have
large hubs at Chicago O’Hare, and these airlines compete
against each other.70
A few large metropolitan areas have airports that are controlled by different governmental entities. Here again, the airports are usually poor substitutes because they are located far
from each other or have operating limitations.71 For example,
the closest New York City area airport not operated by the
PANYNJ is on Islip, Long Island, approximately fifty-four miles
from New York City.72 The nearest Boston area airports not operated by the Massachusetts Port Authority (MassPort) are in
Providence, Rhode Island (sixty-one miles from Boston),73 and
Manchester, New Hampshire (approximately fifty-three miles
from Boston).74 Finally, in Los Angeles, the two closest airports
not operated by the city are the small airports of Burbank, which
has runway restrictions, and Long Beach, which has slot restrictions limiting the total number of flights and a prohibition on
international flights.75
%20Economics%20and%20Financial%20Analysis%2020152016/Readings/Module%2012/How%20Airlines%20Compete%20paper-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7SG7-LCNC].
70 Lauren Zumbach, Southwest Airlines Takes Off at O’Hare: Here’s What It Could
Mean for Fares, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 12, 2021, 5:22 PM), https://
www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-southwest-airlines-ohare-airport-flights20210212-2eoyqfdipfhrjnhwtev7pboyyy-story.html [https://perma.cc/3N7HZ9UU].
71 See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. Well-intentioned airport managers attempting to attract additional flights often strive to operate efficiently and
keep airport charges low. As discussed subsequently, however, they face substantial constraints and countervailing incentives that limit their ability to do so. See
generally A Day in the Life of an Airport Manager, VAUGHN COLL. (May 10, 2018),
https://www.vaughn.edu/blog/day-life-airport-manager/ [https://perma.cc/
3PE8-RU68].
72 Driving Directions from New York City, N.Y. to Islip, N.Y., GOOGLE MAPS,
http://maps.google.com [https://perma.cc/HT3Z-2LA5] (follow “Directions”
hyperlink; then search starting point field for “N.Y.C., N.Y.” and search destination field for “Islip, N.Y.”).
73 Driving Directions from Providence, R.I., to Boston, Mass., GOOGLE MAPS,
http://maps.google.com [https://perma.cc/62R7-Z36M] (follow “Directions”
hyperlink; then search starting point field for “Providence, Rhode Island,” and
search destination field for “Boston, Massachusetts”).
74 Driving Directions from Manchester, N.H., to Boston, Mass., Google Maps,
http://maps.google.com [https://perma.cc/HF3Z-A6EF] (follow “Directions”
hyperlink; then search starting point field for “Manchester, New Hampshire,”
and search destination field for “Boston, Massachusetts”).
75 See Siddharth Ganesh, Hollywood Burbank Airport: Landing, Parking in Under a
Minute, AIRWAYS MAG. (Aug. 8, 2021), https://airwaysmag.com/airports/burbank-airport-land-ops-under-min/ [https://perma.cc/K3MA-GVWD]; Pierce
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Apart from the fact that most airports are poor substitutes for
each other, most U.S. air service is provided by airlines that operate national and international route networks and have a
strong incentive to maximize the number of markets they serve.
For example, business travelers often prefer to concentrate their
business with one airline in exchange for the “loyalty” benefits
given to high volume customers (such as upgraded class of service or additional credits used for free flights).76 If a network
airline77 stops flying to an important market, the airline will not
only lose the passengers currently traveling to and from that
market but will also suffer an additional loss in the overall attractiveness and value of its network.
Apart from the relatively few independently managed airports
that serve the same or substantially overlapping market areas,
there are two circumstances in which airports may be weak substitutes for each other. First, airports in leisure destinations,
such as Orlando and Ft. Lauderdale, FL, may be substitutes for
each other for price-sensitive, leisure travelers looking for sunny
destination vacation trips, even though the airports are geographically distant from each other.78 In this situation, however,
Nahigyan, New Rules Passed for Flight Slots at Long Beach Airport, Airlines Split on the
Issue, LONG BEACH BUS. J. (Dec. 3, 2018), https://lbbusinessjournal.com/newrules-passed-for-flight-slots-at-lgb [https://perma.cc/S4G6-G56S]. In the Washington, DC area, the State of Maryland operates Baltimore/Washington International Airport (BWI) while the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority
(MWAA) operates Washington Dulles International (IAD) and Reagan Washington National (DCA) airports. See About MDOT MAA, BALT./WASH. INT’L
THURGOOD MARSHALL AIRPORT, https://www.bwiairport.com/flying-with-us/
about-bwi/about-mdot-maa [https://perma.cc/69LW-SR35]; About the Airports
Authority, METRO. WASH. AIRPORTS AUTH., https://www.mwaa.com/about-airports-authority [https://perma.cc/64FK-MZFC]. DCA has slot restrictions that
limit the total number of flights as well as a prohibition on international flights
requiring border control facilities. See DCA Reagan National – Slot & Perimeter
Rules, METRO. WASH. AIRPORTS AUTH., https://www.flyreagan.com/about-airport/aircraft-noise-information/dca-reagan-national-slot-perimeter-rules [https:/
/perma.cc/HL9E-A94K]. Also note that the Metropolitan Washington Airports
Authority board includes three members appointed by the Governor of Maryland. Board of Directors, METRO. WASH. AIRPORTS AUTH., https://www.mwaa.com/
about-authority/board-directors [https://perma.cc/9HLB-Z8UG].
76 Phil Seward-Collinson, Why Loyalty Programs are Key to Meeting Business Travelers’ Demands, PHOCUSWIRE (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.phocuswire.com/collinson-business-travel-loyalty [https://perma.cc/5VBT-T9XZ].
77 This is in contrast with a point-to-point airline, which focuses only on serving
particular routes that do not involve connections. See Gerald N. Cook & Jeremy
Goodwin, Airline Networks: A Comparison of Hub-and-Spoke and Point-to-Point Systems,
17 J. AVIATION/AEROSPACE EDUC. & RSCH. 51, 52 (2008).
78 See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
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travelers will consider total trip costs in evaluating whether to
substitute one airport for the other, and airport cost differentials make up a very small proportion of total trip costs.79
Second, airports that serve primarily as connecting hubs may
have substitutes. For example, in 2015, 68% of the Atlanta airport’s domestic passengers were just changing planes.80 The
figures for other major connecting hubs are shown in Table 2.
Table 2—Percent of domestic passengers at major U.S.
airports who are connecting (2015).81
1 Charlotte
75%
2

Atlanta

68%

3

Dallas/Fort Worth

60%

4

Houston

56%

5

Detroit

50%

6

Chicago O'Hare

50%

7

Minneapolis/St. Paul

49%

8

Salt Lake City

48%

9

New York Newark

47%

10

Miami

47%

An airline that operates a route system with multiple large
hubs may have the option of substituting another hub airport to
route passengers to their final destination, depending on the
circuity82 of the routing that uses the substitute airport. For example, to take passengers from Richmond, VA, to Seattle, WA,
American Airlines operates flights that connect at Charlotte,
NC, or Chicago, IL.83 If the Charlotte airport dramatically inSee infra notes 88, 96 and accompanying text.
See infra Table 2.
81 In connection with this Article, the Author reviewed and analyzed data from
the DIIO commercial database.
82 The circuity is the ratio of the actual distance of the trip divided by the
direct nonstop distance. See Xiaoshu Cao, Feiwen Liang, Huiling Chen & Yongwei
Liu, Circuity Characteristics of Urban Travel Based on GPS Data: A Case Study of
Guangzhou, 9 SUSTAINABILITY 2156, 2157 (2017).
83 Based on analysis of airline schedules for November 2021 using Google
Flights. In connection with this Article, the Author reviewed and analyzed airline
schedules as of November 2021. See generally Flights: Richmond to Seattle,
79
80
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creased its charges, American Airlines could reduce the number
of flights from Richmond to Charlotte and from Charlotte to
Seattle and increase the number of flights from Richmond to
Chicago and from Chicago to Seattle (American Airlines has
other options as well since it has previously used Philadelphia
and Dallas–Fort Worth as connecting airports for flights from
Richmond to Seattle). Other major U.S. airlines also offer multiple routes. For example, from Richmond to Seattle, United Airlines operates flights that connect at Chicago, Newark, Denver,
or Washington Dulles, and Delta Air Lines operates flights that
connect at Atlanta or Detroit.84 Section III.D discusses the effect
of potential airport substitution by network airlines on airport
charges.
A final note on substitutes is that when one airline withdraws
from an airport, the origin and destination85 passengers will
generally switch to the remaining airlines that continue to fly to
the same destinations. If the withdrawal results in the loss of all
nonstop service to a destination, most original passengers will
substitute connecting flights, typically involving a single stop.
Thus, it is important to understand that while airports are usually poor substitutes for each other, airlines are close substitutes
and can easily be replaced so long as there is sufficient travel
demand to a particular destination.
2.

Airport Charges as a Proportion of Total Costs

Another factor contributing to the low price elasticity of demand for airport access is that airport charges make up only a
GOOGLE FLIGHTS, https://www.google.com/flights [https://perma.cc/B3ZJKXAK] (follow “Flights” hyperlink; then search starting point “Richmond, VA,”
and search destination field “Seattle, WA”; then filter airlines to “American”).
84 Based on analysis of airline schedules for November 2021. In connection
with this Article, the Author reviewed and analyzed airline schedules as of November 2021. See Departure: Richmond, VA, to Seattle, WA, UNITED, https://
www.united.com/ual/en/us/flight-search/book-a-flight/results/rev?f=RIC&t=
SEA&d=2021-09-30&r=2021-10-07&sc=7,7&px=1&taxng=1&idx=1 [https://
perma.cc/3JLV-XXUP]; Flights: Richmond to Seattle, GOOGLE FLIGHTS, https://
www.google.com/flights [https://perma.cc/3TCB-HN74] (follow “Flights”
hyperlink; then search starting point “Richmond, VA,” and search destination
field “Seattle, WA”; then filter airlines to “Delta”).
85 These are the passengers who are beginning or ending their air travel at a
particular airport, as opposed to the connecting passengers. See Joseph Vito
DeLuca, What is the Difference Between Origin & Destination and Leg/Segment Inventory Controls?, KAMBR MEDIA (Apr. 7, 2021), https://www.kambr.com/articles/
what-is-the-difference-between-origin-destination-and-leg-segment-inventory-controls [https://perma.cc/A8YD-CKQF].

150

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[87

small proportion of total airline costs.86 On average, airport
charges are 5%–7% of total U.S. airline costs, although this figure can be more than double at some airports.87 Peter Forsyth
observes that “a high proportional increase in airport charges
will only result in a tiny proportional increase in air fares . . .
[which] translates into a very low demand elasticity for airport
services-i.e. considerable market power.”88
In comparison to airport charges, since 2000, fuel costs have
varied from a low of 12% of total airline costs in 2002 to a peak
of 36% in 2008.89 In other words, the change in fuel costs over
this period (twenty-four percentage points) was four times the
total annual airport charges (6%).90
Airport charges are usually measured in terms of the cost per
enplanement (CPE).91 The FAA reports that the average CPE at
U.S. airports in 2019 was $11.50.92 CPEs vary widely, ranging
from about $2 at Burbank to $50 at JFK.93 As illustrated in FigPETER FORSYTH, AIRPORT PRICE REGULATION: RATIONALES, ISSUES AND DIRECREFORM 11 (2001), https://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/
0004/19840/sub005.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LS8-Q2KD].
87 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
88 FORSYTH, supra note 86, at 11.
89 Fuel Expense as Percentage of Total Expense, MASS. INST. OF TECH., http://
web.mit.edu/airlinedata/www/2015%2012%20Month%20Documents/Expense
%20Related/Fuel/Fuel%20Expense%20as%20Percentage%20of%20Total
%20Expense%20(Excluding%20Transport%20Related%20Expense).htm
[https://perma.cc/TR7Y-QU2E].
90 See id.
91 An enplanement is a departing air passenger. See RICONDO & ASSOCS., AIRPORT OPERATING AND DELAY COST PER ENPLANEMENT (2014), https://airportscouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/
white_paper_measuring_aircraft_operating_costs_and_delay_20140620.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EC6Z-ZCAA].
92 See Operating and Financial Summary – 2019, All Commercial Service Airports, as
of 12/29/2021, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://cats.airports.faa.gov/reports/rpt
127Totals.cfm [https://perma.cc/83YZ-7XMK].
93 Because many trips involve a connecting flight and each flight boarding
counts as an enplanement, the average one-way domestic trip consists of about
1.3 enplanements. In connection with this Article, the Author reviewed and analyzed airport websites and U.S. DOT passenger data. See Data Bank 28DS - T-100
Domestic Segment Data (World Area Code), U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., BUREAU OF TRANSP.
STAT. (Dec. 17, 2021), https://www.bts.gov/browse-statistical-products-and-data/
bts-publications/data-bank-28ds-t-100-domestic-segment-data [https://perma.cc/
8U5E-PA9A] (compiled data on file with author); Origin and Destination Survey
Data, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., BUREAU OF TRANSP. STAT. (Oct. 13, 2021), https://
www.bts.gov/topics/airlines-and-airports/origin-and-destination-survey-data
[https://perma.cc/4SJS-4LBY] (compiled data on file with author).
86
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ure 1, the change in average U.S. domestic airfare over a year or
two may be greater than the total amount of airport charges.
Figure 1—Average One-Way U.S. Domestic Airfare.94
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An example of the minor role played by airport charges as a
portion of total airfares is provided below using two airports in
the Washington, D.C. area. Average one-way domestic airfares
for Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) and Baltimore
Washington International Airport (BWI) for 2010–2015, along
with the average airport charge per enplanement, are shown in
Table 3. During this period, the average one-way domestic
airfare difference between the two airports was about $31, while
the average airport charge difference was about $3.95 If BWI,
which has lower airport charges and airfares, increased its airport charges by 50% and the increase were fully passed through
in higher airfares, the relative airfares of the two airports would
change very little—the average one-way airfare difference between the two airports would still be $26.96

94 In connection with this Article, the Author reviewed and analyzed data from
the Bureau of Transportation Services National Level Domestic Airfare Series.
95 See infra Table 3.
96 See infra Table 3.
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Table 3—Average one-way domestic airfare and average
airport rent and landing fees per enplanement, DCA
and BWI, 2010–2015.97

Airfare

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Avg.

DCA

$179.8

$183.7

$185.4

$182.7

$186.3

$174.9

$182.1

BWI

$135.3

$151.0

$155.8

$153.5

$159.4

$153.9

$151.5

$44.5

$32.7

$29.6

$29.1

$26.9

$21.0

$30.6

$13.3

$12.9

Difference

Airport charge per departing passenger (CPE)
DCA

$13.3

$13.4

$12.8

$13.4

$11.3

BWI

$10.1

$10.0

$9.4

$9.5

$9.8

$9.9

$9.8

$3.2

$3.3

$3.4

$3.9

$1.4

$3.5

$3.1

DCA

7.4%

7.3%

6.9%

7.3%

6.0%

7.6%

7.1%

BWI

7.5%

6.6%

6.0%

6.2%

6.2%

6.4%

6.5%

Difference
CPE % of airfare

In the U.K., the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and Frontier
Economics modeled the airport charge elasticity of demand for
passengers at Stansted Airport, i.e., the change in passenger demand for Stansted resulting from a 10% increase in Stansted
airport charges.98 Stansted is one of five London area airports
and a major base for ultra-low-cost airline Ryanair.99 Therefore,
compared to most airports, an increase in airport charges at
Stansted is likely to have an outsized effect on Stansted air service because of the availability of multiple substitute airports and
the cost-sensitivity of Ryanair.100
97 In connection with this Article, the Author reviewed and analyzed domestic
airfare data from the Bureau of Transportation Services and CPE data from FAA
Forms 127. See supra note 6.
98 The CAA model assumes that airport charges are about 10% of airfares at
Stansted and that 100% of any increase in airport charges is passed through to
ticket prices. Under the full pass-through assumption, the airport charge elasticity is simply the airfare elasticity of demand multiplied by the ratio of the airport
charge to the airfare. See CIV. AVIATION AUTH., ANNEX 3 – STANSTED’S OWN AIRPORT CHARGE ELASTICITY – A SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE AND RESEARCH 3 (2013);
DAN ELLIOTT & CLODA JENKINS, FRONTIER ECON., KEEPING THE LID ON: ANALYZING
COMPETITION BETWEEN UK AIRPORTS (2008), https://www.frontier-economics.com/media/2776/keeping-the-lid-on-final-v4-03-06-08.pdf [https://
perma.cc/858E-Q4RJ].
99 See, e.g., London Stansted Airport, VISIT LONDON, https://www.visitlondon.com
/traveller-information/travel-to-london/airport/stansted [https://perma.cc/
RZ88-6BNV].
100 See CIV. AVIATION AUTH., supra note 98, at 5.
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Even at Stansted, where very high airfare airport charge elasticity would be expected, the CAA found low airport charge elasticity.101 Separately, Frontier Economics explained that “a 10%
reduction in [Stansted Airport] charges, fully passed through,
might be needed to compensate for an additional 1% travel
time” to the airport.102 In other words, it would be necessary to
cut airport charges by 10% to attract air travelers located just 1%
further away from the airport in terms of driving time. In short,
under ordinary circumstances, increases in airport charges have
little effect on passenger choice of airports. The following Section discusses the non-distribution constraint and its role in constraining airport costs and charges.
C.

THE EFFECTIVENESS

OF THE

NON-DISTRIBUTION CONSTRAINT

The non-distribution constraint underlying U.S. airport economic regulation is the primary form of economic regulation
for non-profit and charitable organizations and is found in
many state statutes regulating non-profit organizations.103 In a
widely cited 1980 article on non-profit organizations, Henry
Hansmann concluded that while non-profits could raise prices
or cut quality with little fear of customer reprisal, they lack the
incentive to do so “because those in charge are barred from taking home any resulting profits.”104 The theory is that the lack of
a profit motive helps ensure that non-profits act in the best interests of their customers. Thus, the non-distribution constraint
increases trust in non-profit firms, which reduces the need for
regulation and the cost of regulatory oversight. Hansmann observed that while the non-distribution constraint is generally
“poorly policed,” there is broad compliance, “presumably due to
adherence to social norms that reinforce the legal restraints on
profiteering.”105
Although Hansmann’s trust-based theory of non-profit enterprises has been influential, Andreas Ortmann and Mark SchesSee id. at 9; see also ELLIOTT & JENKINS, supra note 98.
ELLIOTT & JENKINS, supra note 98, at 3.
103 Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835,
838–39 (1980) (“A nonprofit organization is, in essence, an organization that is
barred from distributing its net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise control over it. . .”).
104 Id. at 844.
105 Id. at 875. Similarly, Mike Tretheway argues that by and large, the FAA has
not exercised its power to regulate airport pricing because “not-for-profit governance lacks the incentives for airports to attempt to set unfair prices.” MIKE
TRETHEWAY, AIRPORT OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND PRICE REGULATION 6 (2001).
101
102
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inger argue that it “stands on shaky ground. It can be sustained
only under particular conditions that have been neither carefully described in theory nor subject to empirical assessment.”106
They criticize the theory both for exaggerating the significance
of the non-distribution constraint and assuming that it is perfectly enforced.107
Reliance on a trust-based form of economic regulation to govern airport spending is especially suspect. Elected officials may
not view compliance with the constraints imposed by the revenue diversion prohibition as necessary to maintain stakeholders’
trust. Instead, those officials may view the revenue diversion prohibition as an administrative obstacle to gaining additional resources to meet the needs of local government and help
accomplish personal goals. Interviews with U.S. airport managers confirm that newly elected officials routinely request legal
guidance on the extent to which they may tap airport revenue
for non-airport purposes.108
Hansmann’s observation that there is broad compliance with
the non-distribution constraint is not true with respect to U.S.
airports. Paul Stephen Dempsey notes that “Allegations of the
use of airport revenue for nonairport purposes are abundant.”109 In 2007, the U.S. Department of Transportation Inspector General testified that his office had identified
“hundreds of millions of dollars in airport revenue diversions,
revenues that should have been used for the capital or operating
cost of an airport but were instead used for non-airport purposes.”110 A more recent example is the Inspector General’s
2014 finding that LAX had paid approximately $8 million in the
previous few years to the Los Angeles Police Department without documentation showing that the services provided were airport-related.111
Another issue with the non-distribution constraint is that it
alleviates pressure on airport managers to maximize revenue or
minimize costs. If profits can legally be used only for airport cap106 Andreas Ortmann & Mark Schlesinger, Trust, Repute and the Role of Nonprofit
Enterprise, 8 VOLUNTAS: INT’L J. VOLUNTARY & NONPROFIT ORGS. 97, 97 (1997).
107 See id. at 98.
108 See Peter J. Kirsch & Christian L. Alexander, Permissible Uses of Airport Property
and Revenue, 40 LEGAL RSCH. DIG., Dec. 2020, at 1, 1.
109 Dempsey, supra note 23, at 26.
110 Id. at 27.
111 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., AV-2014-035, FAA OVERSIGHT IS INADEQUATE TO ENSURE PROPER USE OF LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT REVENUE FOR POLICE SERVICES AND MAXIMIZATION OF RESOURCES 1–2 (2014).
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ital or operating costs and cannot be distributed to the airport
owner, then why maximize profits? Under this constraint, why
not break up procurements into more expensive packages that
ensure that many local firms can participate? Why not award
contracts on terms that are especially advantageous to favored
firms?
Taking the two constraints together—the non-distribution
constraint and the limitation to actual airport costs—there is no
reason to believe they create an incentive to limit airport spending. As Anne Graham concludes, “Although such a system can
ensure that the prices are related to costs, it provides no incentives to reduce costs. . . . Cost inefficiencies might be built into
the cost structure . . . . Such a system can also encourage over
investment.”112 Section III.A discusses the prior studies on this
subject, which, despite research limitations, tend to show that
public-sector airports are less efficient than privatized airports.
D.

HOW ELECTED OFFICIALS BENEFIT
SYSTEM

FROM THE

CURRENT

To this point, this Article has focused on the lack of cost reduction or efficiency incentives built into airport economic regulations. This Section describes the associated principal-agent
problem of the politicians’ interests as agents differing from
those of the airlines as principal. In addition, the Article discusses the institutional incentives that make the FAA a reluctant
regulatory enforcer. Finally, in Section II.F, the Article discusses
the influence of consumers and voters as principals.
1.

Airport Spending

Why are politicians drawn to airports? For the same reason
that Willie Sutton robbed banks—that is where the money is. In
comparison with other parts of municipal government, airports
are large commercial enterprises. Because airlines pay the full
cost of the facilities they use, and other commercial tenants pay
rates that far exceed the cost of the facilities they use, many airports accumulate substantial surpluses.113 The result is that local
ANNE GRAHAM, MANAGING AIRPORTS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 155
(3d ed. 2008).
113 FAA rules direct airports not to accumulate funds beyond the amount necessary for future projects, but many airports have accumulated substantial
reserves and the FAA has never taken action to force airports to reduce these
reserves. See generally U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA AIRPORT
112
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officials view the airport as a potential funding source for a variety of projects—as Dempsey points out, “[i]t is understandable
that financially strapped local governments look to airports as
‘cash cows.’ ”114
Figure 2 shows a simplified flow of funds for a typical municipal airport. Airlines provide the majority of airport operating
revenue—approximately 54% over the five years 2013–2017—
while concessionaires provide the rest.115 In addition, airports
issue bonds to pay for capital projects, with the debt service paid
by airlines and other tenants.116 Separately, the FAA provides
grants (from taxes paid by airline passengers) to help fund some
airport projects, such as runways and taxiways.117
Apart from paying debt service, airport spending is primarily
for:
(1) Compensation—for airport employees (who are either
municipal employees at municipal airports or airport authority employees at authority airports);118
(2) Contracted services—a wide range of contracted services,
including design and construction, airport busing,
janitorial services, and specialized maintenance
services;119
(3) City services—services provided to the airports by the local municipality, such as police, fire, payroll, insurance,
and other financial and administrative services;120 and
(4) Airport marketing and promotional activities—such as
advertising, overseas marketing trips, and airport participation in local organizations and events.121
COMPLIANCE MANUAL 17-3 (2009), https://www.faa.gov/documentlibrary/media/order/5190_6b.pdf [https://perma.cc/3E9K-85G3].
114 Dempsey, supra note 23, at 28.
115 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-298, AIRPORT INFRASTRUCTURE:
INFORMATION ON FUNDING AND FINANCING FOR PLANNED PROJECTS 18 (2020).
116 See id. at 19.
117 See id. at 7.
118 INT’L CIV. AVIATION ORG., STATE OF AIRPORT ECONOMICS 3 (2015) https://
www.icao.int/sustainability/airport_economics/state%20of%20airport%20economics.pdf [https://perma.cc/YS4Q-F6HZ].
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 See id. Survey results for 2013 show that capital expenses amounted to 38%
of total airport costs, and operating expenses amounted to 62%. Id. at 2. The two
largest components of airport operating expenses were personnel expenses
(35%) and contracted services (23%). Id. at 3.
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The diagram highlights the two areas which are the primary
focus of the FAA’s prohibition against airport revenue diversion—city services and airport marketing and promotional
activities.
Figure 2—Flow of funds, U.S. municipal airport.

2.

Politicians’ Goals and Methods

Political enterprises seek mutual gains from trade, just as commercial enterprises do.122 In exchange for financial support,
elected officials commonly reward supporters in the form of patronage, i.e., by providing government jobs or influencing contract awards to benefit supporters.123 Airport employment and
spending are substantial, so by including the local airport as part
of the municipal government, officials can influence employment and contracting for a larger enterprise, and the increase
122 Richard E. Wagner, The Peculiar Business of Politics, 36 CATO J. 535, 545
(2016).
123 See, e.g., Jeff Coen & Bill Ruthhart, Weighing Third Term, Emanuel Relies on
Campaign Donors Who Get City Hall Benefits, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 8, 2017, 5:00 AM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-rahm-emanuel-campaign-fundraising-met-0908-20170908-story.html [https://perma.cc/AT3QWGJJ] (reporting that 6% of Mayor Rahm Emanuel’s 100 most loyal supporters
received city hall benefits, including airport contracts).
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in influence comes at a low cost. Elected officials face fewer constraints on airport spending than other municipal spending because airport funding comes primarily from fees charged to
airlines and airport concessionaires, not from taxes charged to
local residents.124 Unlike local residents, distant airline executives cannot vote out of office elected officials who oversee excessive spending by airport managers.125 Also, as discussed in
Section II.B above, airlines do not have a good substitute for the
local airport, and airport charges are a small portion of the total
airline operating expenses.
The stated goals of elected officials concerning airports generally relate to economic development and focus primarily on attracting more flights to facilitate tourism and business and
create local jobs.126 Airports are “recognized as having a catalytic
effect on economic growth and investment and they compete
for airline service.”127 Widely recognized, but often unstated, political goals facilitated by municipal control of airports are to
help fund the municipal budget; reward political supporters; attract campaign contributions; and accomplish broader social
124 See The Cost of Doing Nothing: Why Investing in Our Nation’s Airports Matters:
Hearing Before the Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 116th Cong. 5–6, 20 (2019)
(statement of Lawrence J. Krauter, A.A.E, AICP, Chief Executive Officer, Spokane International Airport) (“[Airports] do not receive general fund support
from [c]ity or [c]ounty taxpayers, and therefore rely on revenues generated by
parking, ground leases, permit fees[,] and concession agreements to fund [their]
operations.”). Out-of-town visitors don’t vote, but resident travelers do, which is
why municipal airports are unlikely to raise parking rates in advance of a local
election. Any shortfall in revenue caused by less parking revenue can be made up
by higher airport charges to the airlines. High taxes on hotel rooms and car
rentals are paid by travelers who don’t vote.
125 Mayors and airport directors view the local airport as the “gateway to the
city” and may believe this requires appropriately impressive architecture. See AAR
Corp. and Oklahoma City Department of Airports Unveil New Gateway to the City at Will
Rogers World Airport, AAR CORP. (July 26, 2010), https://investors.aarcorp.com/
news-releases/news-release-details/aar-corp-and-oklahoma-city-department-airports-unveil-new [https://perma.cc/8B7Q-JQCD]. Since the airlines and other
commercial tenants pay the costs of all development, the city’s development decision calculus is likely to be different than if the city were spending taxpayer
dollars.
126 See generally INDUSTRY HIGH LEVEL GROUP, AVIATION BENEFITS REPORT
(2019).
127 Assaf & Gillen, supra note 13, at 187. See generally Bruce A. Blonigen & Anca
D. Cristea, Airports and Urban Growth: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Policy Experiment (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,Working Paper No. 18278, 2012); JOAKIM KARLSSON, J. RICHARD LUDDERS, DALE WILDE, DARREN MOCHRIE & CRAIG SEYMOUR,
TRANSP. RSCH. BD., AIRPORT COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM SYNTHESIS 7, AIRPORT ECONOMIC IMPACT METHODS & MODELS (2008).
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goals, such as promoting higher local minimum wages, a union
shop, or higher environmental standards.128 Elected officials improve their re-election prospects by using their control over the
airport to help achieve these goals.
Achieving most of these goals requires increased airport
spending, resulting in higher charges to the airlines and other
airport users. For example, greater-than-necessary spending for
city services such as police, fire, and administrative support increases airport charges, as do contract set-asides for local firms,
airport contributions to local organizations, and airport funding
for trade missions.
Airlines have simple goals concerning most airports—to obtain the facilities necessary to accommodate their flights and
passengers and to pay low airport charges.129 Airline executives,
not airport managers, decide how many flights to offer, and airline executives consider the level of airport charges as one factor
in their route planning decisions.130 In theory, higher airport
charges, like higher fuel costs, shift the airline supply curve
upwards and, all other things being equal, reduce the quantity
of air service supplied. Thus, there is some tension between the
elected officials’ separate goals of attracting more flights and
providing more patronage-related benefits for supporters.131
However, as discussed in Section II.B.2 above, charges at U.S.
airports remain a small part of overall airline costs, and therefore airport spending decisions ordinarily have little influence
on air service decisions by airlines.
128 See, e.g., Michael Gannon, PA Approves Wage Hikes at Airports, QUEENS
CHRON. (Mar. 29, 2018), http://www.qchron.com/editions/queenswide/pa-approves-wage-hikes-at-airports/article_836e8518-47a5-51fe-849f-7c8f0da7e6ac.html
[https://perma.cc/9E2L-5MQF]; Patrick McGeehan, Top Minimum Wage in U.S.,
$19 Approved for New York’s Airport Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/09/27/nyregion/airport-workers-minimum-wagenyc.html [https://perma.cc/AWT3-XQM6].
129 In some cases, individual airline managements may also want airport management to take action that favors their airline over others, but federal law forbids airports from unjustly discriminating among aeronautical users. See AIRPORT
SPONSOR ASSURANCES, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. 10 (2014), https://www.faa.gov/airports/aip/grant_assurances/media/airport-sponsor-assurances-aip.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6MR6-8RYZ].
130 Cf. Overview of ASD, TRANSP. RSCH. BD. COOP. RSCH. PROGRAMS, https://
crp.trb.org/acrpwebresource1/overview-of-asd/ [https://perma.cc/3UNR74EZ].
131 Airport managers are often put in the position of trying to balance these
conflicting goals.
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Elected officials use a variety of mechanisms to gain access to
and direct the spending of airport funds. For example, in awarding contracts for food and beverage and retail concessions, airport managers, acting under the direction of their elected
bosses, sometimes break up procurements into smaller bid packages to help ensure that business is spread out among politically
favored firms.132 Such an approach may maximize political contributions, especially if campaign contribution limits are set at
low levels. Further, airports sometimes limit participation in
contract bids to local firms.133 More often, airports set participation goals for local firms or informally signal that bidders are
more likely to be successful if they include local firms in their
teams. Because airport concession contracts can be highly profitable, firms seeking economic rents from these contracts invest
heavily in local lobbying efforts as do labor unions seeking to
ensure that airport contract awards require or favor firms that
employ union labor.134
Municipal control over the airport makes it easier for elected
officials to allocate the cost of city services between the airport
budget and the general municipal budget to minimize the
amount charged to the municipal budget. For example, three
common reports about police staffing at airports are: (1) that
local governments assign the most senior and therefore most
highly-paid police to the airport; (2) that attempts to match municipal police charged to the airport budget with police physi132 See, e.g., Jennifer Oldham, Noam N. Levey & Jessica Garrison, Mayor’s Man
at the Airport Quits Amid Contract Probes, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2004, 12:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2004-apr-07-me-stein7-story.html
[https://perma.cc/A9KX-VPYV].
133 For example, the four construction opportunities that were listed on
MWAA’s website on September 27, 2018, had a “100% Local Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (LDBE) participation requirement.” See 1-180C141: Inspection of
Baggage Handling Systems, National Airport, METRO. WASH. AIRPORTS AUTH., https:/
/www.mwaa.com/business/1-18-c141-inspection-baggage-handling-systems-national-airport [https://perma.cc/F9L2-TUJX] (Sept. 24, 2018). Local Disadvantaged Business Enterprise is defined as a small business concern located within
100 miles of Washington, D.C. See Local Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (LDBE)
Certification, METRO. WASH. AIRPORTS AUTH., https://www.mwaa.com/business/
department-supplier-diversity-dsd-1 [https://perma.cc/7MFH-66BK].
134 See, e.g., Gene Maddaus, Food Fight at LAX, LA WEEKLY (June 24, 2010),
http://www.laweekly.com/news/food-fight-at-lax-2165774 [https://perma.cc/
XXS7-YFLM] (detailing substantial campaign contributions by bidders and appeal of contract award); see also Martin Moodie, DFASS Challenge to Denver Duty Free
Award Dismissed but Appeal Certain, MOODIE REPORT (Jan. 22, 2015), https://
www.moodiedavittreport.com/dfass-challenge-to-denver-duty-free-award-dismissed-but-appeal-certain/ [https://perma.cc/LUR4-AD2G].
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cally present at the airport reveal discrepancies; and (3) when
the municipal budget needs to be cut, the local government may
respond by assigning additional police to the airport so that
their salaries are removed from the municipal budget and paid
instead by airport tenants.135
Marketing and promotional activities funded by airports may
provide benefits primarily to elected officials or the local government instead of the airport. In fact, general marketing
spending by cities and counties, including the staffing of city
promotional offices located overseas, has been charged to airports so frequently that Congress has enacted legislation specifically prohibiting airport spending on general economic
development activities.136 Still, delegations of city officials often
take trips to attractive foreign destinations with little nexus with
the local airport—it is the standard practice for these trips to
include meeting with a foreign airport or foreign-based airline
so that the trip expenses can be charged to the airport.137
Corruption in the form of bribes by contractors and kickbacks
has been a problem at some U.S. airports.138 Not surprisingly,
one prior study of U.S. commercial service airports found that
See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFF., GAO/GGD-85-24, COMPENSATION
STAFFING LEVELS OF THE FAA POLICE FORCE AT WASHINGTON NATIONAL AND
WASHINGTON DULLES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS (1985). Along these same lines,
police and fire equipment purchased by the municipality and charged to the
airport budget is sometimes reported to be physically located elsewhere. See, e.g.,
U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., AV-2014-035, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT REPORT: FAA OVERSIGHT IS INADEQUATE TO ENSURE PROPER USE OF LOS ANGELES
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT REVENUE FOR POLICE SERVICES AND MAXIMIZATION OF RESOURCES (2014); U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., R4-FA-7-035, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT REPORT: DIVERSION OF AIRPORT REVENUE DADE COUNTY AVIATION
DEPARTMENT (1997).
136 See 49 U.S.C. § 47107(k)(2)(B); Policy and Procedures Concerning the Use
of Airport Revenue, 64 Fed. Reg. 7696, 7701 (Feb. 16, 1999)
137 See, e.g., 3 Orlando Airport Officials Repay Travel Expenses, TAMPA BAY TIMES
(Oct. 8, 2005), https://www.tampabay.com/archive/1993/02/07/3-orlando-airport-officials-repay-travel-expenses/ [https://perma.cc/WNU5-YDVS].
138 See, e.g., Dan Klepal, Stephen Deere & Kelly Yamanouchi, Reed Withheld Subpoena Aimed at Airport in Atlanta Bribery Probe, ATL. J.-CONST. (May 14, 2018),
https://www.ajc.com/news/local-govt—politics/reed-withheld-subpoena-aimedairport-atlanta-bribery-probe/FIA4zpU23eJQkzML5R1PbP/ [https://perma.cc/
32CM-DDJ6]; Robert Snell, Feds: Detroit Airport Manager Took Bribes, Ate Evidence,
DETROIT NEWS (May 23, 2018, 6:02 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/
news/local/wayne-county/2018/05/23/detroit-metro-jim-warner-airport-briberyindicted-feds/636871002/ [https://perma.cc/AB7L-25LN]; Douglas Hanks,
Miami International Airport Official Arrested on Bribery Charges, MIAMI HERALD (Sept.
23, 2016), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/
article103657392.html [https://perma.cc/2ZLC-XKAH].
135
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“airports are less productive in more corrupt environments.”139
The study also found that airports in more corrupt environments tend to use more contractors to replace in-house labor
(perhaps because contractors are better positioned than employees to pay kickbacks and provide significant political contributions).140 More commonly, though, politically-motivated
airport spending is either entirely legal or goes undetected.
Even when illegal revenue diversion is detected, the remedy is
only that the municipality must return the diverted funds to the
airport with interest.141 The revenue diversion regulations state
that once the FAA finds reasonable cause to believe that revenue
diversion has occurred, “such [enforcement] action will cease if
the airport sponsor agrees to return the diverted amount plus
interest.”142 The FAA has the authority to impose a civil penalty
and to consider prior airport revenue diversion violations in
awarding future grants,143 but there does not appear to be any
evidence that the FAA has done so. Elected officials may worry
about possible bad publicity from revenue diversion violations,
but apart from this concern, the risks to elected officials that
divert airport revenue are low.
3.

Role of the FAA

Even with aggressive enforcement of the revenue diversion
prohibition, elected officials can lawfully direct airport spending
to help them accomplish their political goals. But does the FAA
even attempt to enforce the revenue diversion prohibition aggressively? Allegations of revenue diversion are abundant, and
the independent U.S. DOT Inspector General has found FAA
oversight inadequate.144
Jia Yan & Tae Hoon Oum, The Effect of Government Corruption on the Efficiency
of US Commercial Airports, 80 J. URBAN ECON. 119, 119 (2014) (examining the relationship between a general statewide measure of corruption with the efficiency of
locally run airports). Yan and Oum caution, however, that the statewide corruption measure may paint with too broad a brush since airports are creations of
local governments, which presumably vary broadly within a state in their attitudes
towards corruption. See id.
140 See id.
141 Policy and Procedure Concerning the Use of Airport Revenue, 64 Fed. Reg.
at 7722.
142 Id.
143 See 49 U.S.C. § 46301(a)(3), (e)(2).
144 See supra notes 109–111 and accompanying text.
139
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Why is this? A likely reason is that the same office within the
FAA serves as both grantor to and regulator of airports.145 In its
role as grantor, the FAA Airports Office awards several billion
dollars in airport grants annually, maintains ongoing relationships with airport managers and staff, and maintains only limited contact with airline staff.146 In its other role as regulator, the
FAA Airports Office “monitors airport sponsor [i.e., city and
county] compliance with limits on the use of airport revenue,”
and “adjudicates formal complaints.”147 In addition, FAA Airport Office employees may come from or go on to positions with
airports or airport consulting firms.
Federal agencies with grant-making authority have a history of
reluctance to cut-off funds to grant recipients, which has been
explained on multiple grounds, including that “funding cut-offs
will hurt the grant program’s beneficiaries and so will undermine the agency’s ultimate goals . . . [and] that agencies are
neither designed nor motivated to pursue funding cut-offs.”148
Long-term FAA-airport relationships and the movement of FAA
and airport staff back and forth also make it more likely that the
FAA will resolve disputes between conflicting airline and airport
interests in favor of airport interests. The FAA’s lack of appetite
for its economic, regulatory enforcement role is signaled by its
oft-repeated statement of its “fundamental position” that “the
issue of rates and charges is best addressed at the local level by
agreement between users and airports.”149 For a regulator to repeatedly advise a monopolist (the airport) and a consumer (the
airline) to work out their differences on their own seems unlikely to result in effective economic regulation of the
monopolist.
145 See What We Do, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (June 27, 2016), https://
www.faa.gov/about/mission/activities/ [https://perma.cc/89RV-PADD]; FAA
Awards $898.9 Million in Airport Improvement Grants, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (May
13, 2021), https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/faa-awards-8989-million-airport-improvement-grants?newsId=26100 [https://perma.cc/64JP-Z5YJ]. Within the Airports Office, the actual grant award and grant compliance staffs are separate. See
Airports, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/arp/ [https://perma.cc/U2WF-BAZB].
146 See Airports, supra note 145.
147 See Airport Compliance and Management Analysis, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/arp/offices/aco/
aco100/ [https://perma.cc/SC8U-BJ94].
148 Eloise Pasachoff, Agency Enforcement of Spending Clause Statutes: A Defense of the
Funding Cut-Off, 124 YALE L.J. 248, 248 (2014).
149 Policy Regarding Airport Rates and Charges, 61 Fed. Reg. 31,994, 32,017
(June 21, 1996), amended by 78 Fed. Reg. 55,330, 55,331 (Sept. 10, 2013).
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Do alternate forms of public-sector governance do a better
job of avoiding the inefficiencies that result from local political
control? After municipal governance, the next most common
form of airport governance is the airport authority, a quasi-governmental entity with its own governing board and non-municipal workforce.150 “Airport authorities may be created by state
legislation, municipal or county action, or sometimes by joint
agreement among jurisdictions. . . . Appointments to an airport
authority or board may be made by a wide variety of organizations, including city, county, or state elected officials, business
organizations such as the chamber of commerce . . . .”151 Are
airport authorities more independent from political influence?
Airport authorities are often considered to have a degree of
separation from elected officials and municipal government,
and therefore are thought to operate more like a business.152
But this is not necessarily the case. For example, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey commissioners are appointed for six-year terms by the respective governors of New
York and New Jersey, who retain the right to “veto the actions of
the commissioners from his or her own state.”153 There have
also been reports, such as “Bridgegate,” involving actions by Port
Authority employees to punish political opponents of the Governor of New Jersey.154
Similarly, Jia Yan and Tae H. Oum, in their study of airport
corruption, observe that “simply creating mission-focused agencies [such as airport authorities] as a way to reform governance
structure with the purpose of improving the efficiency of providing local public services would not work well under corrupt
environments . . . .”155
A study on airport governance by the Bureau of Governmental Research, a non-profit New Orleans think tank, summarizes
the strengths of airport authority governance as follows:
Hazel, supra note 50, at 16.
Id.
152 Id. at 23.
153 See Governance, Ethics and Integrity, PANYNJ, http://corpinfo.panynj.gov/
pages/governance-ethics/ [https://perma.cc/3NME-8FJH].
154 See, e.g., Ex-Boss of Airport, Bridge Agency Admits Corruption, TIMES LEADER (July
14, 2016), https://www.timesleader.com/wire/national-wire/565259/ex-boss-ofairport-bridge-agency-admits-corruption-2 [https://perma.cc/4TMP-ARDF].
155 Yan & Oum, supra note 139, at 128.
150
151
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There [is] . . . less red tape, a single purpose and focus, greater
freedom from politics, and the ability to run the airport as a business. . . . They can also improve management by operating independently of traditional municipal civil service systems, thus
allowing for higher salaries and more flexibility in hiring and firing. They can bypass cumbersome local . . . processes [including
certain procurement and decision-making processes]. Authorities are generally perceived as less subject to local political influence, leading at times to the criticism that they are unresponsive
to citizens’ concerns.156

However, the study also concluded:
The fact that an airport is owned and operated by an authority
will not in and of itself result in better management and less political interference. The success of a given authority depends to a
large extent on who the members are, what their true interests
are, and the history and culture of the community.157

Evidence regarding the charge levels of airport authorities,
port authorities, and municipal airports is discussed in Section
III.D.3.
F.

THE ROLE

OF

CONSUMERS/VOTERS

Missing so far from this discussion is any mention of the role
of consumers and voters and their interest in how airports are
run. It turns out that their role is usually very limited. A consumer’s primary air travel relationship is with the airline, not the
airport. Airlines find that consumers place little weight on the
quality of airport facilities in making air travel decisions.158 Leisure travelers focus primarily on the ticket price and secondarily
on the convenience of the flight schedule, while business travelers do the opposite.159 Both leisure and business travelers are
unaware of the airport charges paid by airlines.
Elected officials are often sensitive to airport parking rates
that are visible and paid directly by local residents who park at
156 BUREAU OF GOVERNMENTAL RSCH., NEW ORLEANS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT:
GOVERNANCE, REGIONAL COOPERATION AND AIRPORT EXPANSION 32 (1999).
157 Id.
158 Cf. Kimon Proussaloglou & Frank S. Koppelman, The Choice of Air Carrier,
Flight, and Fare Class, 5 J. AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 193, 193 (1999) (providing a model
to quantify travelers’ tradeoffs in choice of air travel).
159 Id. at 198. Also, leisure travelers “are more prone to searching for tickets, an
average of 2.48 times compared to 1.03 times for business travelers.” David Liu, A
Model of Optimal Consumer Search and Price Discrimination in the Airline Industry 1 (Nov. 15, 2015) (Research paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), http://economics.mit.edu/files/11072 [https://perma.cc/8VVT-EM4X].
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the airport, unlike airport charges.160 As a result, airport managers at municipal airports may refrain from raising parking rates
in the run-up to elections. In addition, elected officials are
sometimes sensitive to the prices charged at airport restaurants
and shops.161 In some cases, airports use benchmarks from the
surrounding community to limit airport food and beverage
prices either to the same level as in the surrounding community
or, more often, to an amount of 10% or so higher.162 Finally,
since only visitors rent cars at airports and stay at local hotels,
local taxes on rental cars and hotel stays are usually set at much
higher rates than other local taxes.163
The airport issue that attracts the most heated attention by
voters is the level of aircraft noise that residents experience
from aircraft flying at low altitudes.164 This issue has very little
connection with how the local airport is managed. Because the
FAA sets flight paths and federal law regulates aircraft noise
emissions, local elected officials’ involvement consists primarily
of lobbying the FAA directly or through members of Congress to
alter flight paths.165
G.

SUMMARY

OF

PART II

Summarizing the findings of Part II, current airport economic
regulations provide little incentive for airports to control costs
or allocate capital efficiently. They invite local elected officials to
become deeply involved in employment and contracting decisions at U.S. airports, leading to inefficiencies and higher airport charges. Because of the FAA’s institutional relationship
See, e.g., Rich Connell, Critics Want City to Tap Airport, Port Profits: Government:
Steep Increases in Travel Spending by Two Commissions Have Prompted Calls for Tighter
Controls. Some Officials See Cash-Rich Agencies as a Way to Ease Fiscal Problems, L.A.
TIMES (Nov. 4, 1991, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-199111-04-me-691-story.html [https://perma.cc/QMA7-TK6K].
161 See, e.g., LEIGHFISHER, TRANSP. RSCH. BD., AIRPORT COOPERATIVE RESEARCH
PROGRAM REPORT 54, RESOURCE MANUAL FOR AIRPORT IN-TERMINAL CONCESSIONS
18 (2011).
162 See id. at 149.
163 See Rental Car Taxes, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 30, 2019),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/rental-car-taxes.aspx [https://
perma.cc/F8RL-4DRV].
164 See, e.g., Katy McLaughlin, Affluent—and Angry—Homeowners Raise Ruckus
Over Roar of Overhead Planes, WALL ST. J. (July 5, 2018, 11:59 AM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/affluentand-angryhomeowners-raise-ruckus-over-roar-ofoverhead-planes-1530806379 [https://perma.cc/C2LP-SHE6].
165 See id.
160
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with airports, the FAA is reluctant to investigate or enforce the
revenue-diversion rules aggressively.
Elected officials benefit from the current system in multiple
ways: (1) by gaining access to airport funds to pay for city employees, city services, and city-preferred events without tapping
tax-funded budgets; (2) by influencing contract awards to favored firms, resulting in less effective procurement; (3) by implementing policy initiatives such as local minimum wage and
“green” initiatives via airport contracting requirements that do
not affect the city budget; and (4) sometimes by obtaining campaign contributions from firms eager to earn economic rents
from their airport work.
The creation of independent airport authorities may help but
does not necessarily solve these problems. Air travel consumers
and voters remain uninvolved and largely unaware of these issues because the direct economic impact on them is minimal.
III.

WHY DOES THE CURRENT SYSTEM PERSIST?

Based on the analysis so far, the benefits of the current system
of airport governance and economic regulation are obvious for
local elected officials but not for airlines. Are there alternatives
that offer greater benefits for both? Specifically, why not privatization, which may offer substantial financial payoffs for local
governments? This Part discusses why the current system persists. It begins by discussing the privatization alternative adopted
by much of the world and the rarely implemented U.S. version
of privatization permitted under federal law.
A.

THE ALTERNATIVES AND THEIR ADVANTAGES
DISADVANTAGES

AND

Although the range of possible alternatives to the U.S. system
is broad,166 the preferred alternative for national governments
166 The alternatives include making minor modifications to the current system,
such as separating the responsibilities for grant making and economic regulatory
enforcement into separate agencies with different goals and constituencies. They
also include privatizing particular airport functions or projects, for example, by
contracting with a developer to build and operate restaurants and shops at an
airport or even entire terminal buildings. See TANG, supra note 3, at 2. These
partial privatizations offer some private sector efficiency benefits to airlines and
other tenants, while preserving some control benefits for politicians. See id. at 3.
For example, in these projects, airports usually require set-asides for disadvantaged and local businesses. See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., CONTRACTING WITH DOT: A
GUIDE FOR SMALL BUSINESSES 21 (2021). Also, in some cases, politicians can influ-
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in many countries is privatizing airports.167 Airport privatization
began in 1987 when the U.K. government privatized London
Heathrow, Gatwick, and Stansted airports by creating the British
Airports Authority and its subsequent share offering.168 The
most recent estimates are that 75% of air passengers in Europe
travel through airports with a majority or near-majority private
ownership and that globally, “43% of all air travelers use airports
with significant private ownership.”169 As of 2014, “at least 450
airports around the world have been privatized to some
degree.”170
Privatization itself means little beyond the fact that an airport
is privately managed and at least partially privately owned. What
are the economic regulations associated with privatization, and
what incentives do those regulations create?
Airport economic regulations generally fall into three categories: rate of return, price cap, and price monitoring.171 Rate of
return regulation is used in France and Ireland.172 Price cap regulation is used in the U.K. and Denmark.173 Price monitoring,
also termed light-handed regulation, is used in Australia and
New Zealand, where the government has the right to intervene
if it finds that charges are too high.174 Also, in a few cases, govence the developer’s selection of contractors, but their degree of control is usually less than if the airport directly selected contractors. An example of partial
privatization is the Denver airport’s award of a contract to a private consortium to
design and reconstruct the main terminal. The airport and the consortium have
a cost-sharing agreement and the consortium will manage the concessions for
thirty years. See Stephanie Kelly, Denver Approves $1.8 Billion, 34-Year Public-Private
Airport Contract, REUTERS (Aug. 15, 2017, 5:15 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-municipals-denver/denver-approves-1-8-billion-34-year-public-privateairport-contract-idUSKCN1AV2IJ [https://perma.cc/2H3E-K6B7].
167 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
168 See Graeme Wearden, History of BAA, GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2008), https://
www.theguardian.com/business/2008/aug/20/baa.theairlineindustry1 [https://
perma.cc/AG6N-6DKM].
169 See ROBERT W. POOLE, JR., ANNUAL PRIVATIZATION REPORT: AVIATION 4
(2020) (citing AIRPORTS COUNCIL INT’L, POLICY BRIEF: CREATING FERTILE
GROUNDS FOR PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN AIRPORTS 5 (2018)).
170 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 10, pmbl.
171 See David Gillen, Airport Governance and Regulation: The Evolution Over
Three Decades of Aviation System Reform 9–10 (Oct. 2008) (unpublished manuscript) https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254272063_Airport_Governance_and_Regulation_the_Evolution_over_Three_Decades_of_
Aviation_System_Reform [https://perma.cc/MJ6M-KPZD].
172 See id. at 10.
173 See id.
174 See id. at 9.
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ernments have left airports unregulated because competition
between airports obviates the need for regulation.175 London
City Airport, which competes with several regulated nearby
London area airports, is an example of an airport that is not
subject to economic regulation.176 In contrast, U.S. airport economic regulation has been described as a cost-of-service
approach.177
All forms of economic regulation have drawbacks.178 With
rate-of-return regulation, the regulated firm has an incentive to
over-invest to increase its total profits.179 With price monitoring,
the intervention criteria are unclear.180
Forsyth writes that “Conventional wisdom suggests that pricecaps are the best form of price regulation.”181 Commonly used
RPI-X price regulation relies on price caps to ensure that airline
airport charges increase more slowly than inflation.182 In the
U.S., the airline agreements negotiated in the San Juan privatization discussed in Section III.B and the attempted privatization of Midway follow the RPI-X model.183 Two major issues with
RPI-X are the complexity of setting the initial price, which then
escalates using an agreed-upon formula, and the incentive to cut
service quality inherent in price-cap regulation—this means that
price-caps bring with them not only the complexity of setting
the price cap but also a set of regulations over service quality.184
Laffont and Tirole point out the information asymmetry inherent in price cap regulation—the regulator does not know how

175 But see Joskow & Rose, supra note 11, at 1453 (“One should not assume that
the unregulated regime would be a perfectly competitive regime; many regulated
industries have characteristics that make this assumption quite implausible.”).
176 See PETER SCOTT, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF AIRPORTS IN THE UK 6 (2004).
177 See Gillen, supra note 171, at 9.
178 See, e.g., Joskow & Rose, supra note 11, at 1452.
179 Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory
Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1052 (1962).
180 See Gillen, supra note 171, at 16.
181 Peter Forsyth, Price Regulation of Airports: Principles with Australian Applications, 33 TRANSP. RES. PART E 297, 299 (1997).
182 RPI-X refers to retail price inflation (RPI) minus expected efficiency improvements (X). RPI-X Regulation, BODY OF KNOWLEDGE ON INFRASTRUCTURE
REGUL., https://regulationbodyofknowledge.org/glossary/r/rpi-x-regulation/
[https://perma.cc/A2EL-6HFV].
183 See infra notes 206–207 and accompanying text.
184 Forsyth, supra note 181, at 304.
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much effort the regulated firm has put into cost-reduction when
the initial price is set or the full extent of its ability to do so.185
M.E. Beesley questions the effectiveness of RPI-X regulation
as applied to U.K. airports on multiple grounds, including the
fact that the economic regulator serves multiple roles (along the
lines of the FAA).186 Similarly, Cathal Guiomard argues that the
effectiveness of the RPI-X approach depends on the assumption
that the “[e]conomic regulators arrive from out of the blue to
correct the imperfections of the market without themselves being analysed as entities pursuing their own institutional or other
objectives . . . .”187
Recognizing that the “best” form of economic regulation is far
from ideal, the question remains whether the combination of
private governance and price-cap regulation offers clear benefits
over the current U.S. system of public-sector governance and
cost-of-service regulation. In the U.S., the pervasiveness of public-sector airport governance precludes a direct empirical comparison of public sector and privatized airports. Also, U.S.
airports differ from airports in other countries in their services
and approach to fee categorization, so it is difficult to compare
airport efficiency at municipal airports in the U.S. with privatized airports elsewhere.188 In Europe, however, there are a significant number of both privatized and government-managed
airports, so the two can be compared.
A. Georges Assaf and David Gillen examine the joint impact
of governance and type of economic regulation on airport efficiency in Europe.189 They find that regulated, publicly owned
airports are the least efficient and that the greatest improve185 Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms,
94 J. POL. ECON. 614, 626 (1986).
186 See generally M.E. Beesley, Airport Regulation, in REGULATING UTILITIES: A
NEW ERA? 81–105 (M.E. Beesley, ed., 1999).
187 Cathal Guiomard, Optimal Economic Regulation: A Short Survey of Developments
from the 1970s to the 1990s, in THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF AIRPORTS: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN AUSTRALASIA, NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPE 193, 198 (Peter Forsyth, David W. Gillen, Andreas Knorr, Otto G. Mayer, Hans-Martin Niemeier &
David Starkie eds., 2004).
188 These include differences in the charging mechanism for security, air traffic management, ground handling, and other services, and the entity providing
such services. See INT’L CIV. AVIATION ORG., supra note 118, at 2 (detailing an
overview of non-U.S. airport revenue sources).
189 Assaf & Gillen, supra note 13, at 187. They use the number of employees,
non-labor expenses, and capital deployed as input variables and the number of
passengers, aircraft movements, and non-aeronautical revenue as outputs. See id.
at 191.
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ments in airport efficiency are driven by changes in the type of
price regulation and not by changes in governance.190 A limitation of the Assaf and Gillen study and other airport efficiency
studies is that while efficiency may be a valid measure of societal
benefit, airport efficiency gains may not be passed on to airlines
or other stakeholders in the form of lower charges.
One of the few studies to specifically address the issue of
privatization’s effect on airport charges concludes that privatization reduces aeronautical charges.191 Using a dataset covering
sixty-one European airports over eighteen years, Volodymyr
Bilotkach, Joseph A. Clougherty, Juergen Mueller, and Anming
Zhang find that “airport privatization leads to lower aeronautical charges on average.”192 Interestingly, contrary to Assaf and
Gillen, they find that the decision to privatize is more important
than the type of price regulation adopted.193
Airline executives are not convinced that privatization necessarily leads to lower charges, but they are willing to consider it
on a case-by-case basis. The International Air Transport Association (IATA), the trade association representing most major airlines worldwide, acknowledges that “the private sector can play a
meaningful role in bringing expertise and cost efficiencies at
airports” provided the proper framework is in place.194 However, IATA also cautions that “the outcomes to date often have
been disappointing and without the appropriate regulatory controls and balances in place to ensure the benefits are shared
among all parties.”195 U.S. airlines have expressed similar skepticism regarding the U.S. version of airport privatization, which
this Article discusses next.
B.

THE U.S. VERSION

OF

AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION

In the U.S., privatization has been permitted since 1996
under a little-used federal airport privatization program.196 The
Id. at 195–96.
See Volodymyr Bilotkach, Joseph A. Clougherty, Juergen Mueller & Anming
Zhang, Regulation, Privatization, and Airport Charges: Panel Data Evidence from European Airports, 42 J. REG. ECON. 73, 73, 91 (2012).
192 Id. at 75.
193 See id. at 92.
194 Airport Privatization Fact Sheet, INT’L AIR TRANSP. ASS’N (Nov. 2020), https://
www.iata.org/en/iata-repository/pressroom/fact-sheets/fact-sheet—-airportprivatization/ [https://perma.cc/Z3H5-AH3A].
195 Id.
196 See 49 U.S.C. § 47134. In 1996, 49 U.S.C. § 47134 authorized the FAA to
establish an airport privatization pilot program limited to five airports. In 2018,
190
191
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U.S. version of airport privatization differs from the most common versions elsewhere in two significant ways. First, a
supermajority of the airlines serving a U.S. airport must approve
of the privatization for the local government to use the privatization proceeds for non-airport purposes.197 This is critical because local governments would have almost no interest in
privatization without gaining the right to use privatization proceeds for non-airport purposes. Supermajority airline approval
is also required for the private operator to increase airline
charges at a rate greater than inflation.198 These required approvals effectively grant the airlines the right to approve or disapprove proposed airport privatization. Second, U.S. airport
privatization means that the privatized airport loses access to
tax-exempt financing.199 The U.S. version of airport privatization has other differences as well, but they are minor.200
How important are these two differences? First, the need for
local governments to obtain airline approval of privatization to
realize its full benefits creates a hurdle that governments in most
other countries do not face. In most countries, the central government has the authority to privatize airports without airline
approval.201 Still, to the extent that privatization offers a clear
benefit to airlines over the current system, why should airlines
withhold their approval? Second, taxable debt is slightly more
Congress amended the law to remove the limitation on the number of airports,
effectively ending the pilot program, and renamed the program as the Airport
Investment Partnership Program (AIPP). See Airport Investment Partnership Program,
FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.faa.gov/airports/airport_compliance/privatization/ [https://perma.cc/X54C-HJSQ].
197 See TANG, supra note 3, at 4 n.6 (“For any primary airport participating in
the AIPP, the use of sale or lease proceeds for non-airport-related purposes requires approval by 65% of the scheduled air carriers serving the airport and by
the scheduled and unscheduled air carriers representing 65% of the total landed
weight of all aircraft serving the airport in the preceding calendar year.”).
198 Id. at 5.
199 Id. at 10.
200 For example, the private airport operator must obtain an FAA waiver of the
obligation to repay prior federal grants, and may also need to obtain a local property tax waiver. See Permitted and Prohibited Uses of Airport Revenue, FED. AVIATION
ADMIN. 15-2 (Sept. 30, 2009), https://www.faa.gov/airports/resources/publications/orders/compliance_5190_6/media/5190_6b_chap15.pdf [https://
perma.cc/FES4-TGE2]. However, these are largely administrative hurdles as the
private airport operator is likely to receive both waivers. These types of administrative hurdles are also present elsewhere in the world as evidenced by the relatively slow and uncertain pace of the airport privatization process in most
countries.
201 See TANG, supra note 3, at 11.
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expensive than tax-exempt debt, but the difference is sufficiently small,202 and the restrictions on the use of tax-exempt
debt are sufficiently severe that some U.S. airports already issue
taxable debt instead of tax-exempt debt. Many are considering
accessing the international taxable debt markets regularly as a
competitive alternative to U.S. tax-exempt debt.203
There has been little interest in the program since its inception in 1996—only two U.S. commercial-service airports are
privatized: San Juan, P.R., and Stewart/Newburgh, NY, and
Stewart has since reverted to public-sector operation.204 Still, the
San Juan experience and the city of Chicago’s failed attempt to
privatize Chicago Midway in 2008 provide indications of the circumstances under which privatization is most likely to occur.
This Article discusses these cases in the next Section.
In both the attempted privatization of Midway airport and the
privatization of San Juan airport, new long-term airline agreements were negotiated with the airlines, which provided the required supermajority approval of the proposed privatizations.205
At Midway, the negotiated agreement capped total airline landing and terminal fees for the first six years of a twenty-five-year
agreement at a fixed amount below the then-current total and
made rates subject to a CPI increase for the remaining nineteen
years.206 At San Juan, a very similar approach was used with total
airline fees capped at a fixed amount for the first five years of a
fifteen-year agreement, subject to a CPI increase for the remain-

202 See Issuing Taxable Debt, GOV’T FIN. OFFICERS ASS’N (Mar. 5, 2021), https://
www.gfoa.org/materials/issuing-taxable-debt [https://perma.cc/A8NT-C487].
203 See, e.g., DALL. FORT WORTH INT’L AIRPORT, REQUEST FOR QUALIFICATIONS
FOR UNDERWRITING SERVICES 3 (2017) (“The Airport has finalized its decision that
future bonds, issued for terminal improvements, will be issued as corporate-like
taxable bonds.”). The 1986 Tax Reform Act imposed a number of restrictions on
the use of tax-exempt bonds, and created two types of tax-exempt bonds: government activity and private activity bonds. Airport terminals cannot be financed
with government activity bonds. The interest on private activity bonds is included
in the owner’s alternative minimum tax calculation, which reduces the benefit of
their tax exemption. See STEVEN MAGUIRE & JOSEPH S. HUGHES, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., RL31457, PRIVATE ACTIVITY BONDS: AN INTRODUCTION 1–2, 6 (2018).
204 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 10, at 14; Tang, supra note 3,
at 5–8.
205 See TANG, supra note 3, at 7–8.
206 SHERI ERNICO, BRUCE BOUDREAU, DAN REIMER & STEVE VAN BEEK, TRANSP.
RSCH. BD., AIRPORT COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM REPORT 66, CONSIDERING &
EVALUATING AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION 86 (2012).
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ing ten years.207 In sum, the airlines agreed to support airport
privatizations in the U.S. in these two cases.
C.

WHY HAS

THE

U.S. NOT WIDELY ADOPTED AIRPORT
PRIVATIZATION?

If we assume that privatization is neither clearly better nor
clearly worse than the current system of public-sector governance in terms of higher efficiency and service levels and lower
airport charges, the question remains: why aren’t municipalities
motivated to privatize their airports in exchange for substantial
change-of-control payments—a key feature of airport privatization? A review of the Chicago Midway and San Juan cases helps
explain why.
In the Midway case, the mayor of Chicago ultimately concluded that the cost of losing the ongoing benefits of local control was higher than the financial benefits of privatization.208 In
the San Juan case, the governor of Puerto Rico reluctantly concluded that the airport’s financial situation was so dire that the
territory needed to give up control of the airport in exchange
for a substantial cash infusion.209 In both cases, elected officials
made clear that they placed a very high value on their ability to
control airport employment and resource allocation decisions.
When the City of Chicago began exploring the privatization
of Midway Airport in 2005, its stated goal was to extract value
from the airport and use part of the proceeds to reduce the
city’s unfunded pension liability.210 The city listed various other
goals, including improving Midway’s service quality, growth
prospects, and efficiency, but the transaction was motivated primarily by the amount of the potential sale proceeds.211 In addition, to obtain labor support for the transaction, the city
required that the new operator include various labor protection
provisions, including a guarantee that current Midway employees would be offered comparable positions with similar compensation at the privatized airport.212
207 Record of Decision for the Participation of Luis Muñoz Marı́n International
Airport, San Juan, Puerto Rico, in the Airport Privatization Pilot Program, FAA
Docket No. 2009-1144, at 8 (Feb. 25, 2013).
208 See infra notes 219–221 and accompanying text.
209 See infra note 224 and accompanying text.
210 See ERNICO ET AL., supra note 206, at 86, 97.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 98.
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In 2006, Chicago applied to the FAA to privatize Midway Airport.213 The city subsequently obtained airline approval for the
transaction and solicited bids, which were received on September 30, 2008, two weeks after the collapse of Lehman Brothers.214 Because of the global financial crisis, the high bidder
could not come up with the full payment of $2.52 billion for the
ninety-nine-year lease of the airport and, therefore, forfeited its
$126 million breakup fee.215
The city was considering reviving the transaction, but in the
meantime, residents were experiencing the ill effects of the
city’s privatization of its parking meter system under the prior
mayor.216 In 2009, the city had awarded a seventy-five-year lease
to a private operator providing the right to operate and collect
fees from the city’s 36,000 parking meters in exchange for $1.15
billion.217 The public was reportedly unhappy about the higher
rates charged by the private operator and the operator’s poor
maintenance of the meters.218
As a result, Rahm Emanuel, the new mayor of Chicago, imposed various additional conditions on the revived Midway
privatization transaction.219 These conditions reserved for the
city more of the benefits usually transferred to the private operator, thereby reducing the value of the airport privatization to
bidders.220 Emanuel wrote that “a true public-private partnership requires that taxpayers maintain control of the asset and
share in management decisions and financial profit.”221 He appointed a board of outside advisers, including alderman and labor leaders, capped food and parking prices, and shortened the
Id. at 97.
Id.
215 Id. at 99.
216 See Reid Wilson, How Parking Meters Killed Privatization of Midway Airport,
WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/
wp/2013/09/13/how-parking-meters-killed-privatization-of-midway-airport/
?utm_term=.6093c1bb4d93 [https://perma.cc/HB9A-7WX5].
217 Id.
218 Id.; Chicago Midway Airport Privatisation: Anatomy of a US Airport Lease, CAPA
(Mar. 11, 2013, 1:35 AM), https://centreforaviation.com/insights/analysis/chicago-midway-airport-privatisation-anatomy-of-a-us-airport-lease-99948 [https://
perma.cc/4C88-64Z3].
219 Rahm Emanuel, Mayor Rahm Emanuel: Why I Said ‘No’ to the Midway Deal,
CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 9, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-09-09/opinion/ct-oped-0910-midway-20130910_1_parking-meter-deal-midway-airport-midway-deal [https://perma.cc/RTT7-PVD8].
220 See id.
221 Id.
213
214
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lease term from ninety-nine years to no more than forty years.222
As a result, in 2013, the number of interested bidders dropped
from sixteen to one, at which point the city withdrew its application to privatize the airport.223
The outcome of the San Juan privatization was different because the agency that operated the airport, the Puerto Rico
Ports Authority (PRPA), was in dire financial straits; when the
transaction closed, the PRPA was days away from defaulting on a
$600 million debt payment.224 Puerto Rico Governor Garcı́a Padilla, who completed the privatization transaction, criticized his
predecessor for initially agreeing to it but said the territory had
no choice but to go forward.225 He told airport employees that
without the deal, there would be no money to pay their salaries.226 He also said that the PRPA had “zero dollars to invest in
this airport” and that the airport’s infrastructure needed to be
improved quickly.227 Of the initial $621 million payment received by the PRPA, $500 million was used to retire airport and
other PRPA debt.228
Therefore, despite objections by union employees and other
beneficiaries of public sector management, the private operator
of San Juan obtained much greater autonomy than the bidders
in the second Midway privatization attempt. For example, the
private operator was not obligated to hire existing San Juan airport employees.229
Wilson, supra note 216.
Id.
224 Danica Coto, Puerto Rico OKs Airport Privatization Amid Protests, USA TODAY
(Mar. 1, 2013, 10:58 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/todayinthesky/
2013/03/01/Puerto-rico-airport-privatization-deal-lifts-off/1956407/ [https://
perma.cc/RW6J-6E9A].
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Record of Decision for the Participation of Luis Muñoz Marı́n International
Airport, San Juan, Puerto Rico, in the Airport Privatization Pilot Program, FAA
Docket No. 2009-1144, at 17 (Feb. 25, 2013).
229 See Jodi Richards, San Juan Int’l Forges New Territory with Public-Private Partnership, AIRPORT IMPROVEMENT MAG. (July–Aug., 2014), https://airportimprovement.com/article/san-juan-intl-forges-new-territory-public-private-partnership
[https://perma.cc/6M9Q-T7KK]. Still, the PRPA guaranteed that laid-off airport
employees would be given comparable jobs elsewhere within the PRPA. See Record of Decision for the Participation of Luis Muñoz Marı́n International Airport, San Juan, Puerto Rico, in the Airport Privatization Pilot Program, FAA
Docket No. 2009-1144, at 35–36 (Feb. 25, 2013).
222
223
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Time Horizon, Switching Costs, and Risk Aversion

Three important lessons from the Midway and San Juan examples relate to time horizon, switching costs, and risk aversion.
First, the time horizon of the elected official is important.
Elected officials derive benefits from having control of the airport over their political life. If they subsequently become lobbyists, they may continue to benefit from political control over the
airport. Therefore, an elected official with a long time horizon is
likely to place a high value on the expected future benefits of
political control. Conversely, an elected official who does not
plan to run again or expects to be defeated and does not intend
to become a lobbyist is likely to place a low value on the expected future benefits of political control.
Consistent with this theory, the Chicago mayor who supported the original attempted Midway privatization did not run
for re-election.230 For him, the expected benefit of continued
political control of the airport was very low, making privatization
more attractive than would typically be the case. In Puerto Rico,
Governor Luis Fortuño, who supported the San Juan privatization, faced the choice of privatization or allowing the airport to
default.231 He left office after overseeing the privatization
agreement.232
Second, the switching costs incurred by elected officials in
converting from ongoing political control of an airport to privatization need to be considered. For an elected official, converting to privatization means the likely loss of votes from both
public-sector airport employees who may lose their jobs and
other beneficiaries of public sector airport management. Job
guarantees for public-sector airport workers required as part of
privatization are an attempt to minimize this political cost.233
Third, for an elected official, converting to privatization is a
risky venture compared to the status quo, as illustrated by the
public reaction to Chicago’s poorly executed privatization of its
230 See Associated Press, Chicago Mayor Daley Says He Won’t Run for Re-Election,
DENVER POST, https://www.denverpost.com/2010/09/07/chicago-mayor-daleysays-he-wont-run-for-re-election/ [https://perma.cc/4UG6-KUDU] (May 5, 2016,
12:34 AM).
231 See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
232 See Duane Morris, The Privatization of Puerto Rico’s Luis Muñoz Marin International Airport is Complete, LEXOLOGY (Feb 28, 2013), https://www.lexology.com/
library/detail.aspx?g=90353099-c4ef-477b-b340-eb43f5fb05d8 [https://
perma.cc/4JQE-CJ4W].
233 See Richards, supra note 229.
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parking meters.234 This uncertainty reduces the expected value
of privatization for a risk-averse politician and the airlines.
Airline executives generally regard the current system as less
efficient than private-sector management, with slow decision
making and execution, overstaffing, and ineffective contracting
for construction and other services.235 Even so, airline executives
believe that public-sector managers are less likely to take advantage of the airport’s monopoly position by raising rates to maximize profits.236 They worry that the privatization alternative
could be worse for them than the status quo.237 Thus, both airline executives and politicians view the conversion to privatization as riskier than the status quo, which reduces the expected
value of privatization for both.
The requirement for supermajority airline approval of privatizations puts the airlines in a position where they do not need
to approve a proposed privatization unless they are confident
that the results will be favorable.238 Such a situation occurred
with the privatization initiatives led by the mayor of Chicago and
governor of Puerto Rico, which the airlines approved.239 Still, no
airline has initiated the efforts to privatize or strongly advocated
for the privatization of a U.S. airport,240 which suggests that the
expected risk-weighted benefits of privatization for airline executives do not significantly exceed those of the current system of
airport governance and economic regulation.
2.

National Ownership and Control Versus Local

An important factor differentiating the U.S. from most other
countries is that U.S. airports are locally owned and operated. In
contrast, the pre-privatization norm in other countries is for airSee Wilson, supra note 216.
Cf. Rachel Premack, The Airline Industry’s Trump-Endorsed Case for Privatizing
Air Traffic Control May Be Getting a Boost, Experts Say, INSIDER (Jan. 27, 2019, 10:57
AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/airline-industry-may-renew-calls-for-privatizing-air-traffic-control-2019-1 [https://perma.cc/QSD9-57HQ] (discussing how
the shutdown of the U.S. federal government in 2019 bolstered the case for privatization of airports for some industry experts).
236 Anne Graham, The Objectives and Outcomes of Airport Privatisation, 1 RSCH.
TRASNP. BUS. & MGMT. 3, 4 (2011).
237 Id.
238 See Poole & Edwards, supra note 2.
239 See id.; Robert Poole, Does Airport Privatization Have a Future in the U.S.?, ENO
CTR. FOR TRANSP. (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.enotrans.org/article/airport-privatization-future-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/2X8M-6W33].
240 See Poole & Edwards, supra note 2.
234
235
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ports to be owned by the national government and operated by
a government-owned entity.241 This was the case in the U.K.,
Spain, Brazil, Mexico, Australia, and many other countries.242 A
study of airport privatization efforts in twenty-five countries
found that in nineteen of them, the national government
“owned all or most of the major airports in those countries”
before privatization.243
Since U.S. airports are subject to local ownership and control,
the scale of the airport privatization process in the U.S. would
be smaller. The U.S. federal government can change airport economic regulations to make privatization more attractive, but
individual municipalities must decide for themselves whether to
privatize the local airport.244 Also, in other countries, privatization decisions and transactions may involve fewer parties because, unlike in the U.S., airlines in other countries may have no
formal role in privatization.245
The motivations for privatization in other countries vary and
include the need for private-sector capital to improve existing
airports as well as a “national move toward[s] privatization,” as
was the case with the U.K.246 In nearly all cases, the government
also receives a substantial one-time or ongoing payment for
transferring control.247 Additionally, in some other countries,
elected officials may be less able to use national control of airports to reward their political supporters, although this subject
is beyond the scope of this Article. If this is the case, then the
241 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 10, at 36–37. In the U.S.,
Washington National and Washington Dulles were the only commercial-service
airports that continued to be owned and operated by the federal government
after the post-World War II transfer of airports to local communities. Douglas B.
Feaver, Years of Deal-Making Enabled Change from ‘Disgrace’ to Showplace, WASH. POST
(July 16, 1997), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/local/longterm/library/airport/history.htm [https://perma.cc/XQ5Z-RH2E]. Federal operation
of these two airports ended in 1986 when the federal government leased the
underlying land and transferred control and management of the airports to a
new multi-state authority. Id. At the time of the transfer, it was recognized that
managing the budgets of these two airports as part of the federal budget process
was difficult at best and that the airports required substantial additional investment. See id.
242 See Graham, supra note 236, at 4, 7.
243 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 10, at 37.
244 See id. at 9, 31.
245 See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
246 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 10, at 37.
247 See id. at 10.
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political benefits of continued control would be lower in those
countries.
3.

Summary

In summary, it seems unlikely that the existence of airline approval rights or the loss of tax-exempt financing are the primary
reasons why U.S. airports are not privatized. Firms involved in
privatizing airports solicit local governments to attempt to persuade them to privatize their local airports but attract little interest.248 The primary reason local governments choose not to
attempt to privatize their airports is the high value that elected
officials place on their ability to control airport employment and
spending decisions.
D.

WHAT FORCES HELP KEEP AIRPORT CHARGES DOWN?

Airlines recognize that the current system lacks incentives to
control airport costs and allocate capital efficiently, yet they
have not been advocates of airport privatization. This Section
explores aspects of the current system that help make it acceptable to airlines.
1.

Airport Charges at Hubs Versus Other Airports

Although airlines have only a limited influence on airport
management and spending decisions at most airports, they have
greater influence at airline connecting hubs, which are precisely
the airports where it is most important that they have influence.
Some background may help explain this. Airports can be divided into connecting hubs and origin and destination (O&D)
airports, i.e., airports that serve mostly as the origin or destination of air travel.249 From a competitive standpoint, the level of
248 See, e.g., Leanna Orr, Why America’s Airports Suck, INST. INV. (Feb. 9, 2017),
https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1505qb43q6bnq/why-americasairports-suck [https://perma.cc/9F9M-P885]. Perry Offutt, a Macquarie Infrastructure and Real Assets executive involved in airport and other privatizations
around the world, discussing U.S. airport privatization, stated that “the U.S. is
different from the rest of the world in some key respects. . . Despite the country’s
focus on capitalism, some local entities, which control most U.S. infrastructure,
are reluctant to privatize because they worry about the potential impact on key
constituents of changing the status quo.” Id.
249 See Andreas Kraus & Benjamin Koch, The Opportunities and Threats of Turning
Airports into Hubs, 11 J. AIR TRANSP. 88, 89 (2006).
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airport charges at connecting airline hubs is more important to
airlines than the level at O&D airports.250
When an O&D airport operates inefficiently and passes
through the inefficiencies in the form of higher charges, all airlines are affected similarly. Take, for example, Sacramento, California, which is an O&D airport.251 If the airport significantly
increases its charges, making it more expensive for airlines to
serve Sacramento, airlines may increase fares to and from Sacramento or supply fewer airline seats at each ticket price level, but
all airlines will be similarly affected.
The situation is different, however, if a connecting hub
greatly increases airport charges. For travel between all but the
smallest destinations, travelers choose airlines, and those airlines have a choice of hubs.252 If one airline connects passengers
through a hub with high charges while another airline connects
passengers through a hub with low charges, the airline using the
high charge hub will have a cost disadvantage relative to its competitor.253 Similarly, if an individual airline connects passengers
through a hub with high charges when it could connect passengers through another hub with low charges, it will needlessly reduce its profits.
It is certainly the case that when an airline considers which
hub to use to connect passengers to particular destinations, its
decisional factors go far beyond the difference in airport
charges.254 For example, connecting passengers over an alternate hub may result in a more circuitous route, increasing fuel
and crew costs and flying time. In addition, the number of passengers originating at the connecting airport for the second leg
of the flight is an important factor in flight profitability.255 Still,
airport charges at connecting airports are important to airlines
for competitive reasons. The fact that airlines, at least arguably,
have substitutes for individual connecting hub airports means
that elected officials in charge of those connecting hubs are
likely to be more responsive to airline concerns about airport
management and spending decisions that affect charges at those
airports. Also, an airline is likely to have many employees at its
hub airports, and airline management is likely to have an ongo250
251
252
253
254
255

See
See
See
See
See
Id.

id. at 99–100.
FORECAST SUMMARY MASTER PLAN, SACRAMENTO COUNTY 6 (2020).
Kraus & Koch, supra note 249, at 90, 98.
id. at 101.
id.
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ing relationship with local elected officials who value that local
employment.
Thus, airline executives have the greatest influence over airport charges at their connecting hubs. Charlotte Douglas Airport, a major connecting hub for American Airlines, is a good
example. Charlotte Douglas Airport has the highest percentage
of connecting passengers among U.S. hubs, with about 75% of
passengers connecting.256 The airport also has among the lowest
airport charges in the U.S., with the airport manager and
elected officials publicly stating that keeping airport charges low
is essential to the city’s success in retaining American Airlines’
hub.257
A second example of a hub airport responding to possible
competition from other hubs is provided by the Denver Airport,
where United Airlines, the hub airline, successfully persuaded
the airport to reduce charges by threatening to move connecting flights.258 In 2014, the airport and United Airlines signed a
lease amendment that relieved United Airlines of the obligation
to pay rent on a substantial portion of its unused leased space in
exchange for United Airlines’ commitment not to cut flights below a certain level.259
If airlines are more likely to persuade airports to hold down
airport charges at connecting hubs, this effect should be seen in
the airport charge data. To this end, this Article’s Author analyzed data for 2015 for the sixty-one U.S. airports with more
than two million annual departing passengers.260 Although only
suggestive, the results support the conclusion that airports with
a higher percentage of connecting passengers have lower
charges. A ten-point increase in the proportion of connecting
256 See supra Table 2; Julie Rose, The Philosophy Behind Charlotte Airport’s Success,
WFAE (Mar. 7, 2013, 4:00 AM) http://wfae.org/post/philosophy-behind-charlotte-airports-success#stream/0Rose [https://perma.cc/2WET-F73T].
257 See, e.g., Rose, supra note 256; supra Table 2.
258 Kristen Leigh Painter, Lease Deal Keeps United at DIA Through 2035, but Will
Up Airport Interest Costs, DENVER POST, https://www.denverpost.com/2014/08/
19/lease-deal-keeps-united-at-dia-through-2035-but-will-up-airport-interest-costs/
[https://perma.cc/8Y28-W3SB] (Apr. 27, 2016, 2:13 AM).
259 Id.
260 These airports carry over 88% of U.S. air passengers and closely correspond
to the airports the FAA classifies as large and medium hub airports. FAA uses the
term “hub” differently than the airlines do, simply as a designation of airport size.
Large hubs are airports that each account for 1% or more of total U.S. passenger
enplanements. See 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(29). Medium hubs are airports that each
account for between 0.25% and 1% of total U.S. passenger enplanements. See id.
§ 40102(a)(31).
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passengers at an airport is associated with a 14%–18% decrease
in airport charges depending on the control variables.261 Note,
however, the important limitations of this type of analysis, as described in the footnote below and the Appendix.262
2.

Analysis of the Leisure Airport Effect on Airport Charges

This Article next examines whether airports at price-sensitive
leisure destinations have lower charges. To support their local
economies, communities that rely on price-sensitive leisure travelers must keep visitor costs low to compete successfully with
261 As a reference point, the average CPE in 2019 was $11.51, so a 16% decrease would be less than $2. See infra Table 4.
262 Airports are known for their heterogeneity which cannot easily be controlled for, and which makes airport statistical analysis problematic. An example
of this heterogeneity is illustrated by the following example: the Denver airport
announced that it is adding thirty-nine new gates at an estimated cost of $1.5
billion, or about $38 million per gate. See Denver International Airport Completes First
New Gates in Its Expansion Program, ENR MOUNTAIN STATES (Nov. 23, 2020),
https://www.enr.com/articles/50796-denver-international-airport-completesfirst-new-gates-in-its-expansion-program [https://perma.cc/C4J2-M3XQ]. By
comparison, the PANYNJ announced that it has contracted with a public-private
partnership to rebuild the LaGuardia central terminal at an estimated cost of
$3.6 billion. See Port Authority Receives Significant Interest From Private Sector to Help
Rebuild LaGuardia’s Aging Central Terminal Building, PANYNJ (Feb. 1, 2012),
https://www.panynj.gov/port-authority/en/press-room/press-release-archives/
2012_press_releases/
port_authority_receivessignificantinterestfromprivatesectortohel.html [https://
perma.cc/3ZRL-S2WR]. The LaGuardia project does not appear to add any
gates, although some of the reconfigured gates will accommodate larger aircraft.
See id. Let us assume that by accommodating larger aircraft the LaGuardia project
in fact adds the equivalent of five new gates, so each gate added costs about $800
million, or more than twenty times as much as an additional Denver gate. The
result of the two projects will be to substantially increase the airport charge differential between LaGuardia and Denver. While it is likely that there are efficiency
differences between the two airports, the most important reason for the widening
charge differential is that LaGuardia occupies a small site, has no area to expand,
and must replace a terminal built in the 1960s for smaller aircraft while continuing to operate. See id. In contrast, Denver has a huge site and can easily expand by
adding gates to the existing concourses built in the 1990s for larger aircraft. See
Jon Murray, PHOTOS: Denver Airport’s Gate Expansions Near the Finish Line, DENVER
POST, https://www.denverpost.com/2021/08/26/denver-international-airportdia-gate-expansion-photos/ [https://perma.cc/52N8-6HPA] (Aug. 26, 2021, 9:50
AM). Controlling for the differences between these two airports in a way that
permits a meaningful comparison of efficiency differences is daunting. Relatively
little serious benchmarking of different aspects of the airport business has been
conducted, perhaps largely because of the obstacle posed by the heterogeneity of
airports. Additional research designed to overcome this obstacle would provide
greater insight into the effects of different forms of governance and economic
regulation on airport performance.
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other leisure destinations that may serve as good substitutes.263
As such, elected officials in charge of airports in these communities are likely to be more sensitive to airline concerns about airport spending, efficiency, and charges.
As mentioned in Section II.B.2, airport charges are usually
only a small part of overall trip costs.264 In addition to connecting hubs, another type of airport that should focus on keeping
airport charges low are airports that serve price-sensitive leisure
passengers. This is because increases in airport charges, if
passed through in ticket prices, are more likely to impact the
travel decisions of price-sensitive leisure travelers than other
travelers.265 Destinations such as Ft. Lauderdale, Orlando, Las
Vegas, Phoenix, and Tampa, are generally price-sensitive leisure
destinations.266 As shown in Table 4, all but Las Vegas have airport charges that are significantly below the U.S. average.
Table 4—Airline CPE at Leisure Destination Airports
Compared with Average and Median among Sixty-One U.S.
Airports with More than Two Million Annual Enplanements,
2015.267
Ft. Lauderdale
$5.84
Las Vegas

$11.79

Orlando

$7.73

Phoenix

$6.26

Tampa

$5.20

Average

$11.19

Median

$9.82

Average
(weighted by
passengers)

$13.17

See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
265 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
266 See Harvey Chipkin, Airlines Shift Focus from Business Hubs to Leisure Destinations, BUS. TRAVELER (Feb. 12, 2021), https://www.businesstravelerusa.com/business-traveler-usa-story/airlines-shift-focus-from-business-hubs-to-leisuredestinations/ [https://perma.cc/P42Y-AY66].
267 In connection with this Article, the Author review and analyzed FAA Forms
127 for fiscal year 2015. See Airport Financial Reporting Program, Fed. Aviation
263
264
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The Appendix illustrates how a leisure destination is associated with a 44%–53% decrease in the airport charge per enplanement depending on the control variables.268
3.

Other Observations

Finally, note that when this Article includes airport governance type as a factor in determining airport charges, the only
apparent relationship between governance type and the level of
airport charges is that multi-modal port authority airports (not
to be confused with single-purpose airport authority airports)
have higher charges. Being governed as a port authority is associated with a 20% increase in the airport charge per enplanement; however, the finding is not statistically significant because
of the small sample size.269 It is not surprising that port authority
airports have higher charges since two of the largest port authorities, PANYNJ and MassPort, have been granted exceptions
from the revenue diversion prohibition, which means that the
profits generated by those airports may be used to subsidize
other unprofitable activities of the port (such as mass transit)
instead of being reinvested in the airport.270
In summary, there is at least some empirical support for the
conclusion that airlines have been more successful at holding
down airport charges at airports with the greatest percentage of
connecting passengers. We need to be careful in drawing firm
conclusions from the data because of the high degree of airport
heterogeneity, small sample size, and difficulty in imposing adequate controls.
E.

WHAT FACTORS MIGHT CHANGE
EQUILIBRIUM?

THE

CURRENT

The previous discussion identified local elected officials and
airline executives as the primary stakeholders who influence the
U.S. system of airport economic regulation. The current equilibAdmin., https://www.faa.gov/airports/airport_compliance/airport_financial_
reporting_program/ [https://perma.cc/85XK-3U6K] (data sourced from the
Airport Financial Reporting Program Web Site (CATS)) (on file with author).
268 See infra Table 5.
269 See infra Table 5.
270 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-684, AIRPORT FUNDING: INFORMATION ON GRANDFATHERED REVENUE DIVERSION AND POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF REPEAL 10–16 (2020). The G.A.O. reports that in Fiscal Years 1995 through 2018,
PANYNJ diverted an average of $197 million annually and MassPort diverted an
average of $35 million annually to non-airport uses. Id. at 9.
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rium is likely to persist as long as elected officials favor the current system while airlines are skeptical of privatization or
indifferent because they worry about its risks. This Section looks
at the factors that might change the current equilibrium. This
Article has simplified the choice of airport economic regulation
to a binary one, although of course, there is a wide range of
possible regulatory regimes. This Article does not explore these
here but suggests that the same principles and trade-offs discussed below apply.
Several factors might change the equilibrium.271 For elected
officials, privatization might become more attractive if (1) fiscal
crises at the local government level increase the need for large
amounts of non-tax based funding; (2) the experience gained
from privatizing one or more large U.S. airports reduces the risk
associated with privatization transactions in the minds of elected
officials or provides other favorable information about privatization, such as higher than expected transfer-of-control payments;
or (3) greater restrictions are imposed on campaign contributions from firms seeking airport business or on the use of airport revenue, or simply stricter enforcement of existing revenue
diversion rules that reduces ongoing control benefits to elected
officials, thereby reducing the benefits they derive from the status quo.
For airlines, the experience gained from the privatization of
one or more large airports might reduce the risk associated with
privatization transactions in the minds of airline executives. The
result could be that airline executives begin to advocate for
privatization. Although the government entities that own airports have the right to decide the form of governance to impose,272 airline support for privatization would increase the
issue’s salience for elected officials. Elected officials currently
271 Tang suggests four changes that might increase the interest in airport privatization: (1) “[o]ffering the same tax treatment to private and public airport infrastructure bonds”; (2) changing grant requirements to reduce the disadvantage
that privatized airports have regarding their required level of contribution to
FAA grant-funded projects; (3) liberalizing the restrictions on the fees private
operators could charge; and (4) “[r]educing the obstacles for public-sector owners to use privatization revenue for non-airport purposes.” TANG, supra note 3, at
14–15.
272 State legislatures often have the right to overrule municipal decisions on
governance and have done so in multiple cases to establish airport authorities.
The airport authorities that govern the airports in San Diego and Detroit are
examples of state-imposed airport authorities. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 170002
(West 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 259.110 (West 2002).
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may not be aware of the potential financial payoff for privatizing
their airports, and U.S. airport directors have no incentive to
educate their political bosses on this issue because they are unlikely to retain their jobs following privatization.273 Tim Bath, a
financial advisor who specializes in airport privatizations, said,
“It would, candidly, surprise most people in local governments
in the U.S. to find out what their assets are worth.”274
IV.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. system of airport economic regulation offers apparent benefits to elected officials who control airport employment
and spending without tapping taxpayer revenue. Changing from
the current system involves some level of risk, as Chicago’s parking meter privatization demonstrated. The political benefits of a
change-of-control payment used to pay down debt or shore up
an underfunded pension system must be weighed against the
returns from continued political control of the local airport that
accrue to elected officials over their political life and, if they become lobbyists, beyond.
Airline executives are aware of the deficiencies of the current
system as compared with private-sector management. The system provides little incentive for airport managers to control
costs or allocate capital efficiently at most airports. Yet few airlines clamor for change. One reason is that, despite the current
system’s inefficiencies, airport charges are not a major part of
the airlines’ cost structure.275 Also, where airlines need to influ273 See generally Patrick Dunleavy, Explaining the Privatization Boom: Public Choice
Versus Radical Approaches, 64 PUB. ADMIN. 16–17 (1986) (setting out why bureaucrats can be expected to oppose privatization under public choice theory). In
other countries with privatized or commercialized airports, airport directors routinely come from the private sector, but in the U.S., airport directors are largely
homegrown from within the airport system or are political appointees. Among
the ten largest U.S. airports, only one is headed by someone who came from a
private sector position. See, e.g., Brent Cagle, Aviation Director, CITY OF CHARLOTTE,
https://charlottenc.gov/aviation/Pages/BrentCagleDirector.aspx [https://
perma.cc/B592-VZUU]; Kelly Yamanouchi, Hartsfield-Jackson’s New Manager Bheodari to Get $310,000 Salary, ATLANTA J.-CONST.: ATLANTA AIRPORT BLOG (July 6,
2021), https://www.ajc.com/news/business/hartsfield-jacksons-new-managerbheodari-to-get-310000-salary/TXYTMBD4AND3FGLX5IT4CNAEKY/ [https://
perma.cc/ZB8R-66XZ]; Christine Perez, Meet the CEO: Sean Donohue of DFW Airport, D MAG. (Oct. 24, 2014, 12:00 AM), https://www.dmagazine.com/publications/d-ceo/2014/november/meet-ceo-sean-donohue-of-dallas-fort-worthinternational-airport/ [https://perma.cc/GUF7-Y7Z6].
274 Guinto, supra note 9.
275 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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ence airport management, they can do so at their connecting
hubs.276 As a result, airports with a higher percentage of connecting passengers generally have lower charges.
Airline executives are risk-averse and know that, in general,
they do not control the entangled political and business environment at the airports where they operate. They worry that the
alternative could be worse than the status quo. However, as illustrated by the Midway and San Juan privatization agreements that
the airlines negotiated and supported, airline executives are willing to support privatization when they are reasonably confident
of the benefits and can minimize the risks.
The current system is not on the brink of change, but some
factors could upset the current equilibrium. These factors include local communities facing fiscal crises which increase the
perceived benefits of raising large amounts of revenue without
increasing taxes; additional airports privatizing successfully and
thereby demonstrating that the risks of privatization are lower
than previously thought; or airlines concluding that the inefficiencies of the current system, in the form of higher costs, lower
service levels, or the lack of responsiveness, are too serious to
continue. In addition, incremental steps towards privatization,
such as increasing the use of private-public partnerships to finance, build, and operate airport terminals, could over time
lead to greater acceptance of privatization.
V.

APPENDIX – DATA AND METHODOLOGY

This Article uses OLS regression to conduct several tests regarding the relationship between airport characteristics and airport charges to airlines.
The data includes:
(1) the airport CPE reported by each airport to the FAA,
modified as described below;
(2) the percent of passengers at the airport making connections from one domestic flight to another;
(3) the percent of passengers at the airport taking international flights;
(4) the average domestic airfare for flights from the airport;
(5) the total number of enplanements at the airport; and
276

See supra notes 256–257 and accompanying text.
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(6) the airport governance type: municipal, including city,
county, or state; airport authority; port authority; or
private.
The reason for collecting this data is as follows: Data on domestic connections is used to measure whether an airport serves
primarily O&D or connecting passengers. The percent of international passengers is used as a control because international
flights require additional airport facilities and services; therefore, airports that handle international flights have higher
charges regardless of governance or economic regulation. The
average domestic airfare is used to measure whether there is a
correlation between airfares and airport charges. The number
of enplanements is used to measure whether there is a correlation between passenger volume and airport charges. The airport
governance type is used to measure whether, even within U.S.
public-sector airports, there are systematic airport charge differences depending on governance type.
Note that we rely on the CPE reported by each airport to the
FAA but have adjusted the FAA data for ten airports. At these
airports, airlines incur additional costs for the terminal facilities
they use either because they constructed and financed those facilities using their funds or because they pay a third party for
separate terminal management and maintenance services usually provided by the airport.277 The additional costs are not included in the FAA data but have been estimated by airport
consultants and are incorporated in our data.278
The results of regressing the log of CPE on the percentage of
domestic connecting passengers are shown in Table 5. The results support the conclusion that airports with a higher percentage of connecting passengers have lower charges. The negative
relationship between the percent of connecting passengers and
airport charges becomes significant once a control is included
for the number of passengers at each airport.279 A ten-point increase in the proportion of connecting passengers at an airport
277 See, e.g., DFW AIRPORT FIN. DEP’T, FY 2017 ADOPTED BUDGET, 8, 17–18
(2017), https://dwuconsulting.com/images/Budget/DFW%202017%20Budget.
pdf [https://perma.cc/CPA4-SPZF].
278 The DFW airport budget contains a summary of these adjustments. See id. at
17–18.
279 Higher passenger volume is associated with slightly higher airport charges.
See generally Philippe Villard, Covid-19: Tailoring Airport Charges to Support the Economic Recovery of Airports, AIRPORTS COUNCIL INT’L: ACI INSIGHTS (Sept. 9, 2020),
https://blog.aci.aero/covid-19-tailoring-airport-charges-to-support-the-economicrecovery-of-airports/ [https://perma.cc/Z7RX-K9BN]. A 10% increase in the
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is associated with a 14.3%–17.8% decrease in airport charges depending on the controls.280 The table also shows the results of
regressing the log of CPE against the leisure destination variable. Finally, the table shows the results of regressing the log of
CPE against the airport governance type.

number of annual passengers at an airport is associated with a 2%–3% increase
in airport charges depending on the controls. See infra Table 5.
280 See infra Table 5. We do not take logs for the connecting percentage or the
international percentage because the relevant change is not a percentage change
over the existing base but is a percentage point increase. For example, a 50%
increase in the percent of international passengers from 2%–3% would have very
little effect on the CPE, whereas a 50% increase in the percentage of international passengers from 20%–30% would have a significant effect on the CPE.
Therefore, the better measure of connecting passenger impact is a function of
the percentage point change—in this case, one point versus ten points—and not
the percentage increase as would be measured by a log comparison.
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Table 5—Regression results—Log of passenger airline cost per
enplanement regressed against the percentage of connecting
passengers and other measures at U.S. Airports with More
than Two Million Annual Enplanements, 2015.281
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Cnx%

-0.745
(0.415)

-1.434**
(0.485)

-1.780**
(0.462)

-1.561**
(0.520)

Intl%

3.258**
(0.523)

2.137**
(0.629)

2.136**
(0.601)

2.003**
(0.616)

LnEnpl

0.216*
(0.104)

0.308**
(0.106)

0.269*
(0.105)

LnFare

1.222*
(0.597)

0.874
(0.605)

0.941
(0.624)

-0.530**
(0.188)

-0.444*
(0.203)

Vacation

Port

0.198
(0.142)

Authority

-0.018
(0.116)

Constant

2.179

-4.328

-2.587

-2.927

F

19.86

13.22

16.47

13.97

**0.000

**0.000

**0.000

**0.000

0.411

0.478

0.533

0.548

61

61

61

61

Prob>F
R

2

Observations

Care must be taken in interpreting the results because connecting hub airports may differ from O&D airports in other
ways that result in lower or higher airport charges. For example,
at connecting hubs, the connecting passengers do not rent cars
281 Standard errors are in parenthesis and are robust to heteroscedasticity.
* 5% statistical significance; ** 1% statistical significance.
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or park, require less baggage handling infrastructure, and are
not subject to security screening.282 These factors mean that
connecting airports have lower infrastructure costs per passenger. On the other hand, parking and rental car operations at
O&D airports are highly profitable, and these profits should
more than offset the higher cost of providing additional infrastructure at O&D airports.283
A. AIRPORT DATA (FISCAL YEAR 2015)284
CPE: Airline Cost per Enplanement for airport charges in $.
DCNX: Percentage of domestic passengers who are connecting at the airport
Int’l: Percentage of passengers who are taking an international flight.
AvgDfare: Average one-way domestic airfare in $.
Enp: Total enplaning passengers in millions.
Governance forms: Mun–Municipal, Auth–Authority,
Port–Port authority, Priv–Private management

See, e.g., Kraus & Koch, supra note 249, at 108.
See id. at 109.
284 In connection with this Article, the Author reviewed and analyzed FAA
Forms 127, U.S. DOT DB1A data, and various airport websites. See supra note 6.
282
283

2022]
Airport

193

UNDERSTANDING AN OUTLIER
CPE1 DCNX

Intl

AvgDfare

Enp

Mun

Auth Port Priv

ATL

4.77

0.68

0.11

169.98

49.78

1

0

0

0

LAX

20.07

0.29

0.27

194.32

37.06

1

0

0

0

ORD

17.65

0.50

0.16

168.86

36.49

1

0

0

0

DFW

9.72

0.60

0.12

173.30

31.71

0

1

0

0

JFK

49.62

0.29

0.53

213.99

28.00

0

0

1

0

DEN

11.97

0.42

0.04

153.04

26.63

1

0

0

0

SFO

16.60

0.27

0.22

211.09

24.37

1

0

0

0

CLT

3.04

0.75

0.07

200.33

22.24

1

0

0

0

LAS

11.79

0.24

0.08

146.81

22.09

1

0

0

0

PHX

6.26

0.45

0.05

167.52

21.94

1

0

0

0

MIA

19.93

0.47

0.50

181.53

21.09

1

0

0

0

IAH

12.27

0.56

0.25

201.71

20.77

1

0

0

0

SEA

10.12

0.33

0.11

179.61

20.22

0

0

1

0

MCO

7.73

0.13

0.13

148.24

18.89

0

1

0

0

EWR

34.31

0.47

0.31

215.91

18.76

0

0

1

0

MSP

6.91

0.49

0.07

194.01

17.75

0

1

0

0

BOS

14.54

0.12

0.15

184.20

16.37

0

0

1

0

DTW

9.86

0.50

0.10

182.64

16.34

0

1

0

0

PHL

13.87

0.39

0.13

186.71

15.21

1

0

0

0

LGA

18.04

0.14

0.06

172.48

14.33

0

0

1

0

FLL

5.84

0.11

0.20

139.37

13.15

1

0

0

0

BWI

9.86

0.36

0.04

153.89

12.02

1

0

0

0

DCA

13.32

0.21

0.02

174.91

11.29

0

1

0

0

MDW

7.54

0.42

0.03

137.04

11.20

1

0

0

0

SLC

3.92

0.48

0.03

184.30

10.70

1

0

0

0

IAD

23.61

0.44

0.33

213.07

10.44

0

1

0

0

SAN

10.29

0.14

0.04

175.18

10.18

0

1

0

0

HNL

9.91

0.25

0.26

236.54

9.58

1

0

0

0

TPA

5.20

0.13

0.04

149.61

9.31

0

1

0

0

PDX

10.72

0.21

0.04

172.64

8.38

0

0

1

0
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Airport

CPE DCNX

Intl

AvgDfare

DAL

3.59

0.36

0.00

129.39

7.42

1

0

0

0

STL

14.42

0.26

0.01

175.03

6.49

1

0

0

0

6.46

0.36

0.00

158.29

6.29

1

0

0

0

HOU

Enp

Mun

Auth Port Priv

AUS

8.12

0.15

0.02

175.33

5.95

1

0

0

0

BNA

7.63

0.25

0.01

177.89

5.93

0

1

0

0

OAK

11.32

0.13

0.03

141.83

5.69

0

0

1

0

MSY

7.75

0.15

0.01

166.08

5.47

1

0

0

0

MCI

7.75

0.17

0.01

169.88

5.29

1

0

0

0

RDU

6.91

0.15

0.02

176.51

5.00

0

1

0

0

SNA

9.91

0.07

0.03

172.60

5.00

1

0

0

0

SJC

9.82

0.09

0.04

166.92

4.90

1

0

0

0

SMF

15.50

0.11

0.02

172.79

4.81

1

0

0

0

SJU

13.87

0.13

0.11

196.61

4.27

0

0

0

1

SAT

7.00

0.15

0.06

189.72

4.21

1

0

0

0

RSW

7.61

0.05

0.04

159.33

4.19

0

0

1

0

IND

9.22

0.15

0.01

182.65

3.96

0

1

0

0

CLE

17.76

0.14

0.02

165.72

3.96

1

0

0

0

PIT

16.73

0.14

0.02

184.25

3.95

0

1

0

0

CMH

7.18

0.14

0.01

187.28

3.36

0

1

0

0

MKE

9.34

0.13

0.02

168.68

3.32

1

0

0

0

OGG

7.06

0.22

0.05

233.34

3.23

1

0

0

0

PBI

4.20

0.04

0.02

164.69

3.14

1

0

0

0

CVG

9.18

0.25

0.03

201.21

3.05

0

1

0

0

BDL

9.20

0.07

0.01

189.62

2.94

0

1

0

0

JAX

7.37

0.12

0.00

180.21

2.74

0

1

0

0

ANC

11.02

0.21

0.02

230.02

2.53

1

0

0

0

ABQ

7.64

0.14

0.00

176.48

2.43

1

0

0

0

BUF

10.58

0.11

0.00

160.70

2.34

0

0

1

0

ONT

10.51

0.05

0.03

167.35

2.12

1

0

0

0

OMA

6.61

0.13

0.00

191.42

2.07

0

1

0

0

BUR

2.32

0.04

0.00

138.19

2.03

0

1

0

0

